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Mad Money: Rethinking Private 
Placements 
Abraham J.B. Cable 
Abstract 
Currently, regulations try to limit unregistered sales of stock 
(private placements) to the “smart money,” either by informing 
investors through disclosure or excluding unsophisticated 
investors from the market. In theory, these smart-money 
approaches promote the dual goals of capital formation and 
investor protection. But in practice, regulators have struggled to 
craft effective disclosure or screening mechanisms. In light of these 
failures, this Article advocates for a new approach—investment 
caps that allow every investor a limited amount of “mad money” to 
invest in risky private placements. This mad-money approach can 
protect investors by encouraging basic diversification and 
liquidity, while advancing capital formation at least as well as 
alternatives. 
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I. Introduction 
When President Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (JOBS Act) into law, he deemed it a potential “game 
changer.”1 Specifically, he commended the law for nurturing the 
next Facebook or Apple by easing restrictions on unregistered 
sales of stock, referred to as private placements.2 But bold 
predictions and plucky name aside, the law is mostly a 
continuation of stale approaches to regulating private 
placements. True, startup companies can now sell stock through 
third-party “crowdfunding” sites modeled after Kickstarter, but 
only after providing prescribed and costly information to 
investors.3 True, a startup company can now solicit investors 
                                                                                                     
 1. Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-
act-bill-signing (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 2. See id. 
And who knows, maybe one of them or one of the folks in the 
audience here today will be the next Bill Gates or Steve Jobs or Mark 
Zuckerberg. And one of them may be the next entrepreneur to turn a 
big idea into an entire new industry. That’s the promise of America. 
That’s what this country is all about. 
 3. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) § 302, Pub. L. 
No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
(creating a new crowdfunding exemption). Prior to the JOBS Act, crowdfunding 
sites were limited to charitable purposes or advanced product sales, out of 
concern that sale of stock would violate securities laws. See Benjamin P. Siegel, 
Title III of the JOBS Act: Using Unsophisticated Wealth to Crowdfund Small 
Business Capital or Fraudsters’ Bank Accounts?, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777, 781–
88 (2013) (describing legal impediments to crowdfunding prior to the JOBS Act); 
see generally C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities 
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) (providing an overview of 
crowdfunding practices and proposals prior to the JOBS Act). For critiques of 
the JOBS Act crowdfunding exemption, see Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding 
or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially 
Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 1735, 1741–44 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of disclosure 
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through its own website, but only if it limits sales to wealthy 
investors deemed capable of making sound financial decisions.4 
Like prior law, the JOBS Act primarily tries to protect investors 
by creating (through disclosure) and identifying (through investor 
qualification standards) the “smart money.”5 
Congress’s decision to double down on these smart-money 
approaches is puzzling. Regulators have struggled to identify 
information that investors actually value, as evidenced by disuse 
of exemptions conditioned on specified disclosure.6 Moreover, it is 
at best questionable whether wealth standards are a reasonable 
measure of investment capabilities—for example, a successful 
dentist may know little about hedge funds.7 For the JOBS Act, 
the unfortunate implications are that: (1) issuers and investors 
will steer clear of the crowdfunding exemption because of its rigid 
disclosure requirements, and (2) the JOBS Act’s liberalized rules 
                                                                                                     
requirements in crowdfunding exemptions); Joan MacLeod Heminway, How 
Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty 
Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments That Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 
865, 867–68 (2014) (criticizing Congress’s role in setting parameters of the 
crowdfunding exemption); Siegel, supra, at 781, 799–807 (critiquing the JOBS 
Act crowdfunding provisions and proposing “a workable solution that properly 
balances the goals of the federal securities laws—the facilitation of capital 
formation through transparent securities offerings and the deterrence of 
investor fraud”); James J. Williamson, The JOBS Act and Middle-Income 
Investors: Why It Doesn’t Go Far Enough, 122 YALE L.J. 2069 (2013) (arguing 
that the crowdfunding exemption should be more accessible to investors who are 
not affluent). 
 4. Prior to the JOBS Act, sales through an issuer’s website or other public 
forums violated the “ban on general solicitation.” See Abraham J.B. Cable, 
Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel 
Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 134 (2011) (providing an overview of the “ban 
on general solicitation” before the implementation of the JOBS Act); William K. 
Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and 
Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2004). The JOBS Act 
eliminated the ban, provided all investors meet wealth standards set forth in 
the accredited investor definition. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).   
 5. Investopedia defines smart money as “[c]ash invested or wagered by 
those considered to be experienced, well-informed, ‘in-the-know’ or all three.” 
Smart Money, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smart-
money.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 6. See infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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for sales to accredited investors leave wealthy but 
unsophisticated investors unprotected.8 
But despite the JOBS Act’s broader failures,9 this Article 
finds something redeeming in one of the law’s more obscure 
provisions. Buried deep in the new crowdfunding exemption is a 
building block for future exemptions—an “investment cap” 
limiting the amount any single purchaser can invest.10 For 
example, an investor with a net worth of $250,000 can invest no 
more than $25,000 in crowdfunding offerings annually.11 In 
contrast to smart-money approaches, an investment cap assumes 
that many individual investments will fail and simply tries to 
mitigate the effects of such losses by preventing a small number 
of private placements from dominating any single investor’s 
portfolio. In other words, each investor is allowed a limited 
amount of “mad money”12 for presumably risky private placement 
                                                                                                     
 8. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Rebalancing Private Placement 
Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2013) 
Based on more than a decade of following, researching, and writing 
about private placement regulation, I fear that the latest round of 
capital formation enhancements has tilted the balance too far in favor 
of capital formation and away from investor protection, especially 
given the size of the private placement market today. 
 9. For a general overview of the JOBS Act and its shortcomings, see 
Michael D. Guttentag, Protection From What? Investor Protection and the JOBS 
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 234 (2013) (“[T]he JOBS Act was notable both 
for the speed with which it was enacted and the limited consideration of its 
potential impact.”). 
 10. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012) (imposing limits on the amount a 
particular issuer can sell to a particular investor in a crowdfunding transaction); 
15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012) (requiring crowdfunding intermediaries to enforce 
an aggregate investment cap taking into account all crowdfunding purchases 
across all issuers). It is not obvious from the language of the JOBS Act that it 
imposes both a per-issuer and aggregate investment cap. See Comment Letter 
from Michael Doud Gill III to the SEC (Jan. 22, 2014), SEC File No. S7-09-
13 (discussing ambiguity in the statute) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). But commentators interpret it in this manner. See, e.g., C. Steven 
Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 
SEC. REG. L. J. 194, 200–01 (identifying the per-issuer and aggregate investment 
limits).  
 11. See infra notes 125–27 and accompanying text (explaining calculation 
of the investment cap). The example assumes that the investor’s annual income 
does not exceed $250,000 annually. 
 12. Wiktionary defines mad money as “[a] sum of money, often relatively 
small in amount, kept in reserve to use for impulsive, frivolous purposes.” Mad 
Money, WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mad_money (last visited Nov. 
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investments, similar to asset-allocation strategies promoted by 
professional investment advisors.13 Despite their inauspicious 
introduction to federal securities law through the mostly flawed 
JOBS Act, this Article argues that investment caps should play a 
far larger role than they currently do in private placement 
regulation. 
Beyond any single reform proposal, it is worthwhile to think 
through investment caps because the exercise requires one to 
confront a surprising gap in legal scholarship. The dominant 
theoretical perspective for evaluating the JOBS Act and other 
private placement regulations is to seek an elusive “balance” 
between capital formation and investor protection.14 But to say 
that Congress and the SEC should balance investor protection 
and capital formation raises more questions than it answers. 
What do we mean by investor protection and why does it 
necessarily need to be balanced against, rather than harmonized 
with, capital formation?15 Once defined, which mechanisms for 
regulating private placements best further the relevant goals? 
Private placement regulation, it seems, is in need of first-
principles analysis. Although legal scholars have written 
comprehensively on the theoretical basis for mandatory 
disclosure for companies undertaking a registered offering,16 legal 
                                                                                                     
19, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 13. See infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing conventional 
investment advice). 
 14. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 3, at 1738 (“Policymakers continually face 
the challenge of effectively balancing the benefits of encouraging small business 
formation against the investor protection goals of the securities laws.”); 
Sjostrom, supra note 8, at 1143 (“Regulating securities entails balancing 
investor protection and capital formation.”); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The 
Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s 
Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 920 (2011) (“[S]ensible and 
successful exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act 
must strike an acceptable balance between investor protection and capital 
formation.”); Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and 
Undiversified, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 302 (1994) (noting “tension” between 
capital formation and investor protection).   
 15. Michael Guttentag recently made important inroads addressing this 
question after noting that the concept of investor protection is surprisingly 
under-theorized. Guttentag, supra note 9, at 209. 
 16. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2009) 
(suggesting that the economic argument for mandatory disclosure “was probably 
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scholarship is surprisingly sparse on fundamental policy issues 
affecting a private placement market that currently exceeds a 
trillion dollars annually.17 In analyzing investment caps, this 
Article frames and begins to address these important issues.  
This Article has four parts. Part II puts investment caps in 
context by describing the basic structure and goals of federal 
securities regulation with emphasis on the goals of capital 
formation and investor protection. Investor protection in 
particular proves to be a slippery concept.18 Securities law, 
including but not limited to private placement regulation, reflects 
multiple notions of investor protection. At times, various notions 
of investor protection are in conflict with each other and with the 
goal of capital formation.  
Part III focuses in on the rationale for, and mechanics of, 
current private placement exemptions. It describes the smart-
money approaches of: (1) scaled-disclosure to investors,19 and 
(2) sorting capable and incapable investors.20 It contrasts these 
ubiquitous approaches to the less common approach of containing 
the damage of failed investments through investment caps and 
similar mechanisms.21 
Part IV argues that investment caps should play a bigger 
role in private placement regulation. The argument focuses on 
the challenges of regulating the wide range of investment 
products sold in private placements. For example, scaled-
disclosure mechanisms are appealing if we are confident in 
regulators’ ability to identify information that is useful across a 
wide range of investment products and to a wide range of 
investors. But, in fact, investors do not rely on the same type of 
information across investment products.22 Similarly, there is a 
                                                                                                     
the most important topic in securities regulation scholarship during the 1980s 
and ’90s”). 
 17. See Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing 
Definition of an Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 689 (2008) (describing 
the size of the market for private placements). 
 18. See infra notes 41–43 (discussing the unclear meaning of investor 
protection). 
 19. Infra Part III.B.1. 
 20. Infra Part III.B.2. 
 21. See infra Part III.B.3 (describing the distinctive logic of investor caps 
and other portfolio mechanisms). 
 22. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the failure of scaled disclosure). 
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strong case for sorting mechanisms if regulators can distinguish 
capable from incapable investors. But regulators have 
understandably struggled to find an accurate proxy for investor 
capabilities that applies across investment contexts.23 (An 
investor may be capable with respect to a real estate partnership 
but not a high-tech startup.) Investment caps, in contrast, may 
function better with incomplete information about investment 
contexts.24 A cap can achieve at least some beneficial 
diversification and liquidity without extensive information about 
the issuer or the purchaser.25 
Part V lays out a proposal for making investment caps the 
centerpiece of private placement regulation, and addresses likely 
objections. Under the proposal, an exemption relying primarily on 
investment caps would replace current Regulation D as the 
primary mechanism for moderately sized private placement 
offerings to individual investors, as opposed to institutional 
investors. Although others have recently recommended an 
increased role for investment caps, this proposal goes further in 
replacing much of the current regulatory apparatus.26 
II. The Structure and Goals of Securities Regulation  
Evaluating the new regulatory tool of investment caps 
requires an understanding of their role in the broader context of 
securities regulation and an understanding of the relevant policy 
goals. Accordingly, this Part provides a brief overview of the 
structure of securities regulation and tries to answer the 
surprisingly difficult question of what this regulatory scheme is 
designed to achieve. 
                                                                                                     
 23. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the failure of sorting). 
 24. See infra Part IV.C (discussing how investment caps are affected by 
regulatory challenges). 
 25. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the benefits of investment caps). 
 26. See infra Part V.C (discussing investment caps proposed by legal 
scholars and an advisory committee established by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
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A. Basic Elements of Federal Securities Regulation 
Federal securities laws are primarily set out in the Securities 
Act of 1933 (the ’33 Act)27 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the ’34 Act),28 and related regulations promulgated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC). These laws 
apply to a broad range of investment products, including stock, 
stock options, bonds, and more esoteric schemes in which 
purchasers hope to profit primarily from the efforts of others.29  
The regulatory scheme has three primary features. A 
prohibition on fraud provides purchasers with remedies, and 
empowers regulators to impose sanctions, if issuers make false 
statements while selling securities.30 In addition, individuals and 
firms with regular involvement in securities transactions, such as 
broker–dealers and investment advisers (referred to as “securities 
professionals”), are subject to various licensing requirements and 
have special duties to clients.31 Finally, and most central to this 
Article, any company selling securities must register the sales 
with the SEC and provide investors with extensive disclosure at 
the time of sale and on an ongoing basis (referred to as 
“mandatory disclosure”), unless the transaction qualifies for a 
specific private placement exemption.32 
Although mandatory disclosure is considered the hallmark 
feature of federal securities law, a great many transactions are in 
fact exempt from registration under various private placement 
exemptions.33 In fact, registered offerings, such as Twitter’s 2013 
initial public offering (IPO), are relatively infrequent occurrences 
                                                                                                     
 27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2012). 
 28. Id. §§ 78a–pp (2012). 
 29. See id. § 77b (defining the term security); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 
U.S. 293, 297–99 (1946) (formulating a test for whether a financial arrangement 
constitutes an “investment contract” and therefore a security). 
 30. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 837–45 (4th ed. 2001) (providing an overview of “weapons in the 
federal antifraud arsenal”). 
 31. See Cable, supra note 4, at 135–47 (describing the regulation of broker–
dealers and investment advisers).   
 32. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (requiring the registration of securities 
transactions); id. § 78m (requiring periodic disclosures). 
 33. See, e.g., infra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (describing various 
exemptions from registration requirements). 
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requiring hundreds of pages of disclosures to investors and 
millions in fees to lawyers, bankers, and accountants.34 In the 
case of smaller transactions, or transactions with a small number 
of sophisticated investors, issuers and their lawyers expend 
considerable time and effort assuring themselves that private 
placement exemptions apply and that full-blown mandatory 
disclosure is not triggered.35 
Though private placements are exempt from registration and 
full-blown mandatory disclosure, they are not exempt from 
regulation altogether. In addition to the ever-present prohibition 
on fraud, private placement exemptions are subject to various 
conditions relating to the offering process, such as requirements 
to limit sales to accredited investors, make abbreviated 
disclosures, or make filings with the SEC.36 
In narrow circumstances, compliance with an investment cap 
is one of these conditions to exemption. For example, a company 
availing itself of the new crowdfunding exemption must sell its 
securities through an SEC-regulated “funding portal,” provide 
purchasers with specified information, and limit the amount each 
investor purchases in accordance with the investment cap.37 
Currently, investment caps are a relatively minor part of private 
placement regulation.38 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Twitter, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Nov. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/000119312513431301/d564001
d424b4.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (providing over 200 pages of disclosures 
to investors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSIDERING AN IPO? THE COSTS OF GOING AND 
BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE YOU 5–10, 12–23 (2012), http://www.pwc.com/ 
en_us/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf (estimating 
costs of conducting an IPO and complying with ongoing public company 
requirements). 
 35. See infra note 36 (describing regulatory requirements of private 
offering exemptions).   
 36. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (describing the 
accredited investor concept in Rule 506 offerings); infra notes 104–05 and 
accompanying text (describing exemptions based on informational 
requirements); 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2014) (requiring an issuer to file Form D in 
connection with certain exemptions). 
 37. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012) (providing a crowdfunding exemption 
and related investment cap). 
 38. See supra note 10 (discussing operation of the crowdfunding investment 
cap). In addition to the crowdfunding cap, the SEC recently proposed an 
investment cap in connection with the new Regulation A+ exemption under the 
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B. The Goals: Capital Formation and Investor Protection 
At one level, the goals of the regulatory apparatus described 
above are easy to identify. Commentators generally agree that 
securities laws—including, but not limited to, private placement 
regulations—should facilitate capital formation and protect 
investors.39 These objectives are so well accepted that they are 
now enshrined in the ’33 Act, with Congress instructing the SEC 
to consider these dual goals in all rulemaking.40 
Despite broad acceptance of these goals, the meanings of and 
relationship between investor protection and capital formation 
are not always clear. In particular, there is no consensus 
regarding the meaning of investor protection. This is somewhat 
surprising given the term’s historical pedigree and prevalence in 
law and legal scholarship.41 As Michael Guttentag states in one of 
the few law review articles addressing the topic: “A fundamental 
question about investor protection has been all but ignored: what 
are the particular harms that securities regulations are designed 
to protect investors from?”42 This subpart looks broadly at 
securities regulation (not only at private placement regulations) 
to identify philosophies of investor protection and explore their 
relationship to securities law’s other goal of capital formation.43  
                                                                                                     
JOBS Act. Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues 
Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities and Exchange 
Commission Release No. 33-9497 (Dec. 18, 2013), at 50–53.   
 39. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the “elusive 
‘balance’ between capital formation and investor protection”). 
 40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (“[T]he Commission shall also consider, in 
addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”). 
 41. See Guttentag, supra note 9, at 208–09 (identifying investor protection 
as a central focus of securities laws); Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and 
Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 181 (2010) (“The SEC has repeatedly called 
investor protection the ‘basic purpose’ of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”). 
 42. Guttentag, supra note 9, at 209. 
 43. The organization of this section draws from Guttentag’s very insightful 
work but does not follow his analysis precisely. Guttentag divides his discussion 
of investor protection into five categories: fraud, an unlevel informational 
playing field, investor mistakes, opportunistic behavior by management (agency 
costs or “tunneling”), and excessive risk. Id. at 233. This Article addresses 
concerns about an unlevel informational playing field under the concept of 
populist investor protection and concerns about investor mistakes and excessive 
risk primarily under the concept of paternalistic investor protection. For 
2264 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2253 (2014) 
1. Capital Formation 
The availability of funding for existing and new businesses 
contributes to a number of policy goals. For example, proponents 
of the venture-capital industry claim impressive effects on 
employment.44 Access to capital may also be a key driver of 
innovation and, in turn, economic growth.45 Because novel 
businesses are not always good candidates for traditional bank 
financing, public and private equity markets take on particular 
importance for innovative companies.46  
These perceived benefits of capital formation, however, do not 
fully explain the relationship between capital formation and 
securities regulation. Given the market-based orientation of U.S. 
securities laws,47 legal scholars have expended significant effort 
                                                                                                     
purposes of this Article’s analysis, tunneling and fraud can be subsumed within 
the single category of investor-choice protection because victims of tunneling or 
fraud do not get what they bargained for and even those not directly victimized 
may withdraw from the market and forego otherwise beneficial transactions if 
tunneling or fraud are prevalent. For a discussion of fraud, see infra Parts 
III.A.1, III.A.2, IV.B.3, and IV.C.  
 44. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy, 
Yesterday’s Startups, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 209 
(2013) (discussing the job-creation claims of the venture-capital industry). 
 45. See ROBERT COOTER, SOLOMON’S KNOT: HOW LAW CAN END THE POVERTY 
OF NATIONS 27–38 (2012) (explaining that economic growth requires the difficult 
task of combining ideas with capital).   
 46. See Cable, supra note 4, at 121 (discussing why startup companies 
struggle to obtain bank financing). Despite the prevalence of capital formation 
as a policy goal, there is a theoretical question of whether capital formation is 
always beneficial. The dot-com bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s, for 
example, was a time of robust capital formation but is now viewed as a period of 
“irrational exuberance.” BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL 
STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 80–98 (2011). To 
some observers, what matters most from a policy perspective is allocative 
efficiency—ensuring that the most promising projects receive funding in 
amounts and at prices that reflect their superior prospects. See FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 280 (1991). And some observers question whether improving the operation 
of stock markets in fact has much effect on the allocation of resources in the 
economy. See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 2.2.2 
(3d ed. 2010) (citing sources on both sides of the debate); Lynn Stout, The 
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing 
and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 618 (1998) (identifying 
allocative efficiency as a common goal of securities regulation but questioning 
actual effects of securities regulation on resource allocation). 
 47. U.S. securities law reflects what Easterbrook and Fischel refer to as a 
MAD MONEY 2265 
in considering why regulation is necessary to achieve the goal of 
capital formation.48 Much of this scholarship has focused on a 
central feature of U.S. securities law: mandatory disclosure.49   
The predominant explanation for a baseline rule of 
mandatory disclosure is that markets would, if left unregulated, 
produce less than the optimal amount of disclosure for investors. 
This argument starts by recognizing that investment 
transactions are plagued by information asymmetry—
entrepreneurs have information that they do not want to 
communicate to investors or that they have trouble 
communicating credibly. Information asymmetry impedes 
otherwise beneficial transactions in several respects. First, it 
increases agency costs because the information imbalance in 
favor of the entrepreneur gives him or her more chances to 
engage in opportunistic behavior.50 Second, difficulty in verifying 
information makes purchasers of securities susceptible to fraud 
(intentional misrepresentation).51 Finally, information 
asymmetry leads to a lemons problem. Unable to distinguish good 
projects from bad, investors are forced to discount all 
opportunities, the most promising projects are underfunded, and 
some savvy investors withdraw from the market.52  
                                                                                                     
“dominant principle” that “anyone willing to disclose the right things can sell or 
buy whatever he wants at whatever price the market will sustain.” 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 277. 
 48. See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 1031 (describing efforts by legal 
scholars to explain the rationale behind mandatory disclosure). 
 49. See infra notes 50–59 (citing examples from this sizable literature). 
 50. See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure 
Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 133–36 (2004) 
(discussing the relationship between disclosure and agency costs). 
 51.  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 280–81 (discussing how 
difficulty in verifying information about securities enables misstatements by 
issuers). Though it seems uncontroversial that information asymmetry 
increases susceptibility to fraud, it is not as clear that mandatory disclosure is 
effective in fighting fraud. See Michael D. Guttentag et al., Brandeis’ Policeman: 
Results from a Laboratory Experiment on How to Prevent Corporate Fraud, 5 J. 
EMP. LEGAL STUD. 244, 250–52, 273 (2008) (noting the “indirect” and “subtle” 
relationship between mandatory disclosure and fraud mitigation, and 
presenting evidence that mandatory disclosure does mitigate fraud). 
 52. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 280 (explaining the 
effects of information asymmetry). 
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The existence of information asymmetry, however, does not 
quite explain why disclosure should be mandatory. After all, 
investors can (and often do) demand disclosure on their own, and 
entrepreneurs can (and often do) provide disclosure voluntarily to 
encourage investment.53 Why would a mandatory disclosure 
system provide information at a level, or of a type, that is 
superior to this voluntary system? 
One problem is that disclosure practices may generate 
positive externalities. For example, a disclosure system that is 
standard or uniform across issuers—asking all issuers to disclose 
the same types of information at the same time—has distinct 
advantages. Investors can use standardized information to more 
easily compare competing projects.54 In addition, a standardized 
system may avoid duplicative efforts to ascertain relevant 
information because disclosure standards reflect past learning 
about which types of information prove effective in evaluating 
projects.55 Despite these advantages of standardized disclosure 
practices, no individual investor is perfectly motivated to bear the 
costs of creating and enforcing such a system because it 
potentially creates benefits for other investors, and no individual 
entrepreneur is perfectly motivated to bear the costs of creating 
such a system because it may create benefits for competitors.56 
If the market does not produce standardized disclosure at 
optimal levels, regulatory action may be warranted.57 A 
                                                                                                     
 53. See id. at 280–83 (discussing how securities markets would operate 
without legal intervention). 
 54. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure 
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 685–87 (1984) (discussing the 
benefits of standardized disclosure requirements). 
 55. See id. at 681–82 (discussing duplicative search efforts by investors). 
 56. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 290–92, 303 
(discussing third-party effects of disclosure); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining 
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor 
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339–45 (1999) (discussing third-party 
effects of disclosure); Guttentag, supra note 50, at 136–38 (discussing third-
party effects of disclosure).  
 57. Whether the current mandatory disclosure scheme is effectively 
designed to achieve this goal is the subject of vigorous debate. See Guttentag, 
supra note 50, at 169–90 (reviewing a voluminous literature on mandatory 
disclosure and arguing that the current system requires disclosure of the wrong 
types of information); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373–80 (1998) (arguing 
that an “issuer choice” regime, where issuers could opt into different degrees of 
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lawmaker could try to address this market failure by: 
(1) developing and mandating disclosure requirements directly, or 
(2) delegating the function to a group of professionals. U.S. 
securities laws are a mix of these approaches. Lawmakers 
directly specify the nonfinancial information that issuers must 
disclose before publicly selling securities.58 For the most part, 
lawmakers have delegated oversight of financial disclosure to the 
accounting profession.59 By requiring issuers to make the 
disclosures recommended by the accounting profession, and by 
vesting accountants with the exclusive right to develop the 
standards, lawmakers create incentives to develop and maintain 
disclosure standards that might otherwise be under-produced. 
In sum, laissez-faire policies may not achieve optimal levels 
of capital formation. Investment transactions are plagued by 
information asymmetry, and market actors may have high 
transactions costs in trying to contract for optimal disclosure. 
Mandatory disclosure can be understood as an effort to give 
investors what they would contract for in the absence of those 
transactions costs. 
2. Investor-Choice Protection 
One philosophy of investor protection focuses on facilitating 
mutually beneficial investment transactions by mitigating 
information asymmetries and the associated problems of fraud, 
agency costs, and lemons market.60 Analogizing to other product 
                                                                                                     
disclosure, would be more effective). 
 58. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2014) (mandating disclosure of information 
about an issuer’s business, property, management, and governance); id. § 239.11 
(requiring this information to be included in the prospectus for an initial public 
offering). 
 59. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (requiring an issuer to provide investors 
with financial information in the form required by Regulation S-X under the ’33 
and ’34 Acts); id. § 210 (requiring that the financial information be audited by 
certified public accountants). 
 60. See Bradford, supra note 3, at 98 (“The SEC has long seen its mission 
as ‘investor protection in the sense of remedying information asymmetries and 
rooting out fraud . . . .’” (quoting Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate 
Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 975, 1005)); supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (describing the 
effects of information asymmetry). 
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markets,61 removing these barriers to efficient investment 
transactions maximizes investors’ surplus. I call this policy goal 
“investor-choice protection” because it focuses on effectuating 
investor preferences. 
In the context of publicly traded companies, this type of 
protection is achieved through the same mandatory disclosure 
system that promotes capital formation. This scheme arguably 
protects investors in the sense of mitigating information 
asymmetries and enabling investors to buy the securities they 
want at the price they deem appropriate.62 For publicly traded 
stock, the protections extend to even those investors who cannot 
themselves understand the disclosures, because information is 
rapidly digested by the market and communicated through 
price.63  
Despite frequent claims that investor protection and capital 
formation need to be balanced—suggesting that they are in 
tension—the two goals are harmonized under this notion of 
investor protection. Capital formation and investor-choice 
protection are two sides of the same coin—reducing barriers to 
matching investor preferences with available investment 
opportunities. Table 1 summarizes the strong relationship 
between capital formation and investor-choice protection. 
3. Paternalistic Investor Protection 
Investor-choice protection is not the only sense in which 
securities laws protect investors. Features of U.S. securities law 
described in this section reflect an alternative notion that I refer 
to as “paternalistic investor protection.” Rather than maximizing 
investor choice, these securities regulations appear designed to 
                                                                                                     
 61. See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text (discussing why it is 
appropriate to analogize to other product markets). 
 62. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 182 (describing a theory of investor 
protection whereby “disclosure protects investors by giving them the tools to 
look out for themselves”). 
 63. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 297 (noting that “[a]s 
long as informed traders engage in a sufficient amount of searching for 
information and bargains, market prices will reflect all publicly available 
information”); Schwartz, supra note 41, at 181–85, 201–08 (discussing, but 
ultimately questioning, market prices as a form of investor protection). 
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save investors from their own bad decisions.64 Paternalistic 
approaches, such as “merit review” of proposed stock terms, were 
prominent in state securities laws that preceded the ’33 and ’34 
Acts.65 Although the ’33 and ’34 Acts preempted most state-level 
regulation of securities transactions, paternalistic approaches do 
survive in subtle ways.66 
For example, the regulatory framework for securities 
professionals, such as broker–dealers and investment advisers, 
imposes duties on these intermediaries when recommending 
investments. Securities professionals are potentially liable if they 
recommend transactions that are deemed “unsuitable” to a 
client.67 Although the client’s subjective investment goals are one 
element of suitability, the intermediary’s recommendation must 
also be appropriate in light of the client’s financial resources and 
age.68 This objective notion of suitability imposes on some 
                                                                                                     
 64. See Guttentag, supra note 9, at 229–32 (explaining that “[t]here is less 
evidence in the historical record that federal securities regulations were enacted 
for the purpose of protecting investors from their own unwise investment 
decisions than might be expected”). Guttentag speculates that prominent 
advocates for the ’33 Act and the ’34 Act may have wanted to avoid blaming 
everyday investors for the harms suffered in the stock market crash. Id. 
 65. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 308 (giving an historical example of a 
Kansas banking commissioner who required banks to report withdraws by 
customers so that the commissioner could review potential investments with the 
withdrawn funds). 
 66. See id. (“In reality, [William O.] Douglas’[s] intuition that doses of 
paternalism were required for effective regulation has insinuated itself much 
more broadly than generally recognized into the federal scheme of securities 
regulation.”). Friedman explains that “[t]hrough quasi-private self-regulatory 
organizations, the necessary paternalism emerged that Congress was unwilling 
to vest in the federal government directly.” Id. Friedman gives the example of 
NASD Rules that require approval of underwriting terms in public offerings. Id. 
 67. See Cable, supra note 4, at 135–47 (describing the regulation of 
securities professionals). 
 68. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Rule 2111 (2014) (providing that a 
broker–dealer is obligated to investigate and base recommendations on the 
client’s “investment profile”). A client’s investment profile includes the client’s 
“age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment 
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk 
tolerance, and any other information the customer may disclose to the member 
or associated person in connection with such recommendation.” Id. Investment 
advisers owe a similar duty to make suitable recommendations based on “the 
client’s financial situation and investment objectives.” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 27–28 (2011). 
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investors a societal judgment about appropriate levels of financial 
risk. 
Similarly, the SEC dedicates substantial resources to 
“investor education.” Through these educational efforts, the SEC 
endorses conventional views of the personal finance industry 
regarding appropriate asset allocation, retirement planning, and 
diversification. For example, the SEC’s website directs users to a 
personal finance calculator that produces a suggested allocation 
of investment assets based on the user’s demographic 
information.69 
Granted, an investor can easily escape these relatively mild 
paternalistic interventions.70 An investor need not seek the 
advice of a broker–dealer before executing a transaction and can 
steer clear of the SEC’s website. But these regulations and 
initiatives do represent an effort, way down in the plumbing of 
securities regulation, to shape and contain investor preferences 
rather than effecting preformed investor choice. 
To be clear, paternalistic investor protection is not always in 
direct conflict with capital formation or investor-choice 
protection. Investors display well-documented cognitive 
shortcomings when making financial decisions.71 Some securities 
regulations appear designed to quell immediate investor impulses 
and provide opportunity for more considered decision-making. 
For example, the ’33 Act imposes a waiting period between a 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Beginners’ Guide to Asset Allocation, Diversification, and 
Rebalancing, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ 
assetallocation.htm (last visited Nov 19, 2014) (directing the user, under the 
section titled, “How to Get Started” to a hyperlinked “online asset allocation 
calculator”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The SEC does 
state that risk tolerance must be decided by the individual investor. Id. Yet the 
asset allocation calculator is not greatly affected by varying the input for risk 
tolerance. Id.  
 70. One could call the SEC’s approach “soft paternalism.” See Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003) (“Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak 
and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced 
off.”). 
 71. See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 197, 226–27 (2008) (summarizing various investor biases); Schwartz, supra 
note 41, at 204–07 (describing “biases that are thought to impact decision 
making in the investment context”); MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 235–52 
(categorizing these biases into overconfidence, biased judgments, herding, loss 
aversion, and pride and regret). 
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public offer of securities and any actual sales.72 Similarly, the ’34 
Act requires that tender offers remain open for a specified 
number of days so that target shareholders have time to carefully 
consider the offer.73 These requirements may impede investor 
choice in the sense of checking immediate impulses, but they can 
be seen as ultimately enabling investor choice viewed at the time 
when cooler heads prevail.74  
Paternalistic regulation may also facilitate capital formation 
by boosting “investor confidence.” Though a frequently cited 
rationale for tightening securities regulations, investor confidence 
is, in fact, a nebulous concept with an unproven relationship to 
stock market participation.75 In one form, investor confidence 
refers to a psychological, and sometimes irrational, sentiment 
that retail investors exhibit towards the market.76 We may worry 
that unsophisticated investors will ascribe too much importance 
to negative experiences or events, and we may therefore try to 
                                                                                                     
 72. See Guttentag, supra note 9, at 230. 
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (2014). A tender offer is an offer by an acquirer to 
buy the stock of a publicly traded company directly from shareholders. See 
PETER V. LETSOU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 165–68 (2006). It is a common mechanism for a corporate 
takeover. Id. 
 74. Similarly, some legal scholars suggest that legal rules can play a “de-
biasing” role by combatting cognitive biases and improving decision making. See 
Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND 
ITS APPLICATIONS 21 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007) (“[L]egal 
policy may respond best to such errors [in decision making] . . . by operating 
directly on the errors and attempting to help people either to reduce or to 
eliminate them.”). 
 75. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the 
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003) (noting that the SEC frequently relies on a 
rationale of restoring investor confidence without rigorously defining the 
concept or citing empirical evidence that investor confidence affects stock 
market participation).    
 76. See Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
407, 415–20 (2002) (discussing the relationship between investor confidence and 
stock market participation, emphasizing the psychology of retail investors and 
factors affecting their long-term trust in markets). But, as Stout recognizes, 
reference to investor confidence does not require a paternalistic mindset—we 
may simply recognize that rational investors will shrewdly withdraw from a 
market plagued by insurmountable information asymmetry. See id. at 410–15 
(discussing the rational-actor model); supra note 52 and accompanying text 
(considering how information asymmetry may cause some investors to withdraw 
from the market).  
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save investors from making mistakes so that they do not 
irrationally shun the market in the future.77 In other words, 
saving investors from themselves may be important to 
maintaining robust public equities markets (capital formation). 
At another level, however, paternalistic protection is in 
tension with capital formation and investor-choice protection. For 
example, an investor near retirement age may genuinely prefer to 
invest in a high-risk startup company. That choice does not 
necessarily indicate a defect in the investor’s decision-making 
process, even if it defies the conventional views of the personal 
finance industry.78 To the extent securities regulations impede 
that investment, a potential source of financing for the startup is 
eliminated, and the goals of capital formation and investor-choice 
protection are stifled. 
One might think this concern is overstated to the extent 
securities are fungible cash flow rights and obligations. In theory, 
if securities laws restrict a particular investor from purchasing a 
particular security, (1) the company could turn to other investors 
or alternative financing sources and (2) the investor could obtain 
similar cash flow rights, with similar risk and return 
characteristics, from a different financial product. In some 
contexts, this may be true. Established companies do have a wide 
variety of financing sources available, including public equities, 
bond issuances, trade credit, and traditional bank financing.79 
Likewise, knowledgeable investors can construct a variety of cash 
flow combinations through investments in publicly traded stocks, 
index funds, mutual funds, private equity funds, life insurance 
products, real estate investments, and so on.80 In some cases, any 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Stout, supra note 76, at 430 (“Rather than dismiss the 
‘unsophisticated investor’ as the weak animal that must sadly but necessarily be 
culled out of the investing herd in order to improve the species, perhaps we 
should pay close attention to his care and feeding.”). 
 78. Cf. Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: The 
Retirement Savings Crisis and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 39–40) (considering, but 
ultimately rejecting, arguments for respecting unconventionally high-risk 
investment strategies in retirement plans).   
 79. See Stout, supra note 76, at 436 (suggesting that bear markets have 
limited impact on well-run companies because they can finance operations from 
sources other than equities markets).   
 80. See infra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing commonly owned 
assets). 
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particular paternalistic intervention may not move the needle in 
terms of capital formation and satisfying investor preferences. 
But in other contexts, neither financing sources nor 
investment opportunities are so fungible. Businesses with limited 
operating history have difficulty accessing public equities 
markets,81 bank financing,82 and in many cases venture capital.83 
Likewise, some investors gain their competitive advantage 
through investing within a narrow area of technical expertise or 
within networks of personal or business relationships.84 In 
addition, an investor may not be interested in cash flow rights 
alone. Investors may select investments based on special tax 
attributes or even for nonfinancial reasons, such as enthusiasm 
for a particular technology or community.85 
In short, paternalistic protection does not have to be 
inconsistent with the goal of capital formation, but it often is. 
Table 1 summarizes this ambiguous relationship. 
                                                                                                     
 81. See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties 
that small issuers face in complying with the mandatory disclosure scheme that 
accompanies public equities markets); Going Public, ENTREPRENEUR, 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/81394 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) 
(suggesting that a company should have a valuation of $100 million to be an 
IPO candidate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 82. See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance 
Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private 
Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 869–70 (2005) (“Because of the 
way that rapid-growth start-ups are structured, they are generally not eligible 
for such commercial bank loans.”).   
 83. See Private Equity for Small Firms: The Importance of the Participating 
Securities Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 109th Cong. 
37–67 (2005) (statement of Colin C. Blaydon, Dir., Center for Private Equity and 
Entrepreneurship, and Susan L. Preston, Entrepreneur-in-Residence, Ewing 
Marion Kauffman Foundation) [hereinafter Private Equity] (discussing the 
“funding gap” that startups face after exhaustion of personal funds and the 
typical $5 million minimum investment amount of venture-capital funds). 
 84. See COOTER, supra note 45, at 27–38 (discussing the importance of 
relational finance to entrepreneurship); Cable, supra note 4, at 130 (discussing 
the investment practices of angel investors). 
 85. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel 
Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1437–39 (2008) (discussing nonfinancial 
motivations of angel investors).   
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4. Populist Investor Protection 
A third notion of investor protection prioritizes participation 
of retail, as opposed to institutional, investors in securities 
markets.86 A number of securities law requirements appear to 
have been designed to maintain a “level playing field” among 
investors of varying wealth, sophistication, and access to 
information. For example, Regulation FD under the ’34 Act 
prohibits publicly traded companies from revealing information to 
professional securities analysts without simultaneous disclosure 
to the public.87 Similarly, insider-trading rules are sometimes 
justified in terms of informational equality between company 
insiders and retail investors.88 I call this policy goal “populist 
investor protection.” 
Like paternalistic investor protection, populist investor 
protection is not always in tension with the goal of capital 
formation. All other things being equal, broad participation in a 
market should improve its performance by increasing liquidity.  
At other times, however, populist investor protection has a 
more distributive thrust that may be in tension with capital 
formation. Policymakers may value equal access to investment 
opportunities more than economic efficiency. For instance, some 
legal scholars argue that insider trading, if permitted, would in 
fact improve the accuracy and efficiency of stock markets and 
therefore assist high-quality issuers.89 But policymakers may still 
prohibit insiders from trading on nonpublic information in the 
                                                                                                     
 86. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3389 (2013) (critiquing the exclusion of retail investors from 
the private placement market); Langevoort, supra note 16; Stout, supra note 76, 
at 430 (“Rather than dismiss the ‘unsophisticated investor’ as the weak animal 
that must sadly but necessarily be culled out of the investing herd in order to 
improve the species, perhaps we should pay close attention to his care and 
feeding.”). 
 87. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.100–.103 (2014). 
 88. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(concluding that corporate insiders must either disclose material nonpublic 
information or abstain from trading).  
 89. See M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 503, 507–08 (2011) (summarizing the views of Henry Manne in INSIDER 
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET). But see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 46, at 
2.2.2 (citing sources disputing the assertion that insider trading rules improve 
accuracy of prices). 
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name of fairness to retail investors. Table 1 summarizes the 
ambiguous relationship between populist protection and capital 
formation. 
III. Private Placement Exemptions: Why and How? 
A. Why Private Placement Exemptions? 
Based on the discussion above, one might wonder why there 
are any exemptions to a baseline rule of mandatory disclosure. 
Mandatory disclosure seems uniquely suited to meet all of the 
goals of securities law described above. By helping investors 
overcome information asymmetry, these regulations can be 
characterized as promoting capital formation and investor-choice 
protection by helping match investors and issuers.90 Mandatory 
disclosure also squares with more paternalistic and populist 
notions of investor protection to the extent that even 
unsophisticated investors benefit from complex information as 
communicated through price.91 
So, as a policy matter, why are some transactions exempt 
from these beneficial mandatory disclosure rules? When would 
the costs of mandatory disclosure outweigh its considerable 
benefits? To answer these questions, it is useful to think about 
the types of investment opportunities and investors typical of 
private placements. 
In terms of investment attributes, consider startup 
companies with novel products or business plans.92 In their initial 
stages, these companies typically seek “seed funding” in amounts 
ranging from $500,000 to $5 million.93 The costs of complying 
with a mandatory disclosure regime, however, are somewhat 
                                                                                                     
 90. See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing capital formation and investor-
choice protection). 
 91. See supra Parts II.B.3–4 (discussing paternalistic and populist investor 
protection).  
 92. This is by no means the only or even predominant type of private 
placement. But the name of the JOBS Act, for example, demonstrates the 
central role that high-growth startups play in thinking about private placement 
regulation. 
 93. See Private Equity, supra note 83 (discussing the financing needs of 
startups prior to eligibility for venture capital). 
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fixed.94 Engaging an accountant to perform an audit in connection 
with a $500,000 offering may cost more than one percent of the 
amount it cost to perform an audit in connection with a $50 
million offering.95 The costs of a comprehensive mandatory 
disclosure system could easily outweigh the entire value of a 
highly uncertain project in its relative infancy. Also, mandatory 
disclosure systems tend to emphasize historical facts over 
projections and future plans, and so provide little benefit to a 
company with limited or no operating history.96  
Of course, private placement exemptions are not limited to 
startup companies, so it is useful to consider how investor 
attributes may also affect the costs and benefits of mandatory 
disclosure. Some categories of investors may not value mandatory 
disclosure because they benefit from a substitute means of 
overcoming information asymmetry. An investor may have a 
relationship to the issuer or its personnel that mitigates typical 
information imbalances and resulting agency costs—for example 
an employment relationship. Alternatively, an investor may have 
superior technical or financial knowledge or experience that 
results in above average ability to formulate disclosure requests, 
evaluate information, and negotiate favorable investment terms.   
Venture-capital investors, for example, likely benefit from a 
number of these substitute protections. Silicon Valley is a close-
knit market with many repeat players, so reputational 
considerations may limit opportunistic behavior by issuers.97 
Venture-capital investors tend to focus their investments in 
                                                                                                     
 94. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 278 (discussing how 
mandatory disclosure laws may favor large issuers because they are not 
generally scaled).   
 95. See Chris Wand, Do Venture Capitalists Demand Audited Financials?, 
ASK THE VC, http://www.askthevc.com/wp/archives/2008/02/do-venture-
capitalists-demand-audited-financials.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) 
(providing cost estimates for audited financials) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 671 (stating that 
many of the costs of disclosure are the same regardless of the size of the firm or 
offering). 
 96. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 305 (explaining that 
mandatory disclosure obligations emphasize objective historical facts).   
 97. See In re Trados Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 1512-VCL, 2013 WL 4511262, 
at *28 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013) (noting the close-knit nature of the Silicon Valley 
environment). 
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particular industries where they have some technical expertise.98 
And venture-capital investors have developed standardized 
investment contracts particularly suited to the information 
asymmetry, agency costs, and uncertainty inherent in startup 
company investments.99 
In sum, for certain types of transactions, the costs of 
mandatory disclosure may be disproportionate to the size of the 
contemplated transaction. And certain types of investors, who 
have substitute means of protection, may not value the benefits of 
mandatory disclosure. As a result, some transactions are 
exempted from the full-blown mandatory disclosure system and 
are instead subject to alternative regulatory mechanisms. 
B. How Private Placements Are Regulated 
At first glance, private placement regulation can appear too 
fragmented for precise analysis. The contours of private 
placement exemptions are defined through a patchwork of 
legislation, judicial interpretation, and rulemaking by the SEC. 
For example, § 4(a)(2) of the ’33 Act provides a statutory 
exemption for sales “not involving any public offering.”100 Because 
this statutory exemption provides issuers with almost no 
guidance, courts stepped in to develop multi-factor tests 
delineating private (i.e., exempt) versus public offerings under 
the statute.101 Addressing concerns that this case law was overly 
subjective and ad hoc, the SEC has developed safe harbor 
                                                                                                     
 98. See Cable, supra note 44, at 238 (“In 2011, nearly 80 percent of 
V[enture] C[apital] investment was made in six industry sectors: software (24 
percent), biotechnology (17 percent), industrial/energy (12 percent), medical 
devices and equipment (10 percent), media and entertainment (8 percent), and 
IT services (8 percent).” (citing statistics from the National Venture Capital 
Association)(footnote omitted)). 
 99. See Cable, supra note 4, at 120–26 (describing standard venture-capital 
investment contracts, drawing on the work of Ronald Gilson, George Triantis, 
and others); Jesse M Fried & Mina Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist 
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 983, 989–90 (2006) (reviewing 
arguments for how preferred stock and board control reduce entrepreneur 
opportunism). 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012). 
 101. See infra note 106–110 and accompanying text (discussing case law 
under § 4(a)(2)). 
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exemptions associated with § 4(a)(2), such as Rule 506 of 
Regulation D.102 Other SEC rulemaking is based on alternative 
statutory authority, such as § 3(b) of the ’33 Act, which states 
that the SEC “may from time to time through its rules and 
regulations” create exemptions for securities issuances of $5 
million or less.103  
Stepping back from this patchwork of legal authorities, 
however, one can see in private placement regulations three 
primary mechanisms for protecting investors: scaled disclosure, 
sorting, and portfolio mechanisms. To date, scaled disclosure and 
sorting are the dominant mechanisms. Investor caps are a 
relatively rare example of a portfolio mechanism. 
1. Scaled-Disclosure Mechanisms 
Private placement exemptions may be conditioned on 
disclosure of specified information, though less than what is 
required for a registered offering. I call these requirements 
“scaled-disclosure mechanisms.” For example, Regulation A 
allows for offerings of up to $5 million if the issuer provides 
financial statements prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles and a disclosure document 
containing nonfinancial information similar to, but less 
comprehensive than, what would be contained in a prospectus for 
a registered public offering.104 Similarly, the most popular private 
placement exemption, Rule 506, requires issuers to deliver this 
same information, but with audited financial statements, to any 
purchasers who do not meet certain wealth or income 
standards.105 
                                                                                                     
 102. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014) (enumerating an exemption for limited 
offers and sales without regard to the dollar amount of the offering). 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 77c. 
 104. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263. For a good overview of the Regulation A 
exemption and the impediments to its more frequent use, see Rutheford B. 
Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Business’ Search for a “Moderate Capital,” 
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 101–12 (2006). 
 105. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
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2. Sorting Mechanisms 
Other exemptions require that issuers sell or offer securities 
to only those investors who meet specified criteria. I call these 
requirements “sorting mechanisms.” In some cases, sorting 
mechanisms seek to identify investors with special relationships 
to the issuer that may serve as substitutes for registration and 
mandatory disclosure. For example, case law interpreting 
§ 4(a)(2) often emphasizes the relationship between the issuer 
and investors. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,106 the seminal case 
under that exemption, the Court considered an issuer’s sale of 
stock to its employees.107 The Court held that a broad offering of 
stock to a wide range of employees did not qualify for the 
exemption, and the Court implied that a narrower offering to 
high-level executives, with meaningful access to information 
about the issuer, would qualify for the exemption.108 Subsequent 
judicial opinions similarly state that an offering is more likely 
exempt when there is a “substantial preexisting relationship” 
between the issuer and the offerees.109 The SEC has incorporated 
the concept of a substantial preexisting relationship into several 
of its safe-harbor exemptions.110 
In other cases, investors are deemed qualified because of 
superior capability in assessing investments. The apparent 
financial sophistication of offerees has been an important factor 
in case law under § 4(a)(2).111 Where courts perceive investors as 
                                                                                                     
 106. 346 U.S. 119 (1935). 
 107. See id. at 120. 
 108. See id. at 125–26. 
 109. See Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 
EMORY L.J. 67, 71–75, 104–09 (1989) (discussing the evolution of the “pre-
existing relationship” requirement).  
 110. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014) (prohibiting sales to nonaccredited 
investors by “general solicitation”). Through no-action letters, the SEC has 
suggested that the best way to avoid a general solicitation is to limit offers to 
persons with whom the issuer has a preexisting relationship. Cable, supra note 
4, at 133–34. The SEC defines a preexisting relationship as one that is in place 
prior to the offering and that “would enable the issuer (or a person acting on its 
behalf) to be aware of the financial circumstances or sophistication of the 
persons with whom the relationship exists or that otherwise are of some 
substance and duration.” Id. (quoting Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55694 (Dec. 4, 1985)).  
 111. See id. at 76 (discussing factors that courts consider in analyzing 
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having enough knowledge about financial matters to request and 
assess relevant information from the issuer, an offering is more 
likely to be considered private and therefore exempt.112 
In an effort to provide issuers with more certainty than the 
§ 4(a)(2) case law, the SEC has incorporated proxies for investor 
sophistication into its safe-harbor exemptions. The “accredited 
investor” standard is the most prominent proxy for investor 
sophistication.113 To qualify as an accredited investor, an 
individual must have annual income of at least $200,000 per year 
($300,000 if filing jointly with a spouse) or net assets of at least 
$1 million (excluding equity in a primary residence).114 Although 
the SEC’s safe-harbor exemptions are not, in theory, limited to 
accredited investors, an issuer receives a number of important 
benefits by limiting an offering to accredited investors. Under the 
popular Rule 506 exemption, an issuer is not required to provide 
audited financial statements or other specified disclosure to 
accredited investors and may engage in a general solicitation if 
all purchasers are accredited.115 
                                                                                                     
§ 4(a)(2)). 
 112. See id. at 75–84 (examining case law that focuses on investor 
sophistication). 
 113. See Campbell, supra note 14, at 929 (discussing the high rate at which 
issuers rely on exemptions requiring accredited-investor status); Friedman, 
supra note 14, at 299–300 (discussing the origins of the accredited–investor 
standard). 
 114. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (providing definitions for Regulation D). 
 115. See id. § 230.502 (setting forth disclosure requirements for Regulation 
D); supra note 4 (discussing recent reforms that permit general solicitation if all 
investors are accredited). Relief from providing audited financial statements is a 
particularly important advantage because a startup company is unlikely to have 
audited financials and investors are unlikely to value them. See THERESE H. 
MAYNARD & DANA M. WARREN, BUSINESS PLANNING: FINANCING THE START-UP 
BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING 234 (2010) (discussing the burdens 
of required disclosure to non-accredited investors). Accordingly, Rule 506 
offerings including nonaccredited investors are relatively rare. See Jennifer 
Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 993, 1002 n.56 (2012) (discussing a recent study of Regulation D offerings 
indicating that 90% included only accredited investors). 
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3. Portfolio Mechanisms (Including Investment Caps) 
Even before the JOBS Act introduced investment caps, some 
aspects of federal private placement regulation subtly reflected 
an alternative method of protecting investors. Instead of 
emphasizing receipt of particular information or perceived 
capabilities, these mechanisms focus on the overall financial 
condition of the purchaser. I call these “portfolio mechanisms.”   
For example, one commentator suggests regulators did not 
initially view wealth standards, such as accredited investor 
status, as proxies for investment capability.116 Instead, wealth 
standards initially ensured that purchasers had adequate 
liquidity to hold presumably illiquid securities for a long 
period.117 The concept was not that wealthy investors had the 
ability to reduce risk through self-help but rather that they could 
absorb risk due to their general financial situation.118   
The ban on general solicitation, which prohibits public 
solicitation of investors under several exemptions,119 has also 
acted in part as a portfolio mechanism because it channels sales 
efforts through broker–dealers.120 Under SEC no-action letters 
interpreting the ban, broker–dealers are granted significantly 
more leeway than issuers in locating investors.121 Therefore, an 
issuer who wants to cast a relatively wide net in searching for 
investors may be motivated to sell through a broker–dealer.122 As 
discussed above, broker–dealers must determine that 
investments are suitable based on the purchaser’s overall 
financial condition.123 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 299–310 (discussing the role of wealth 
standards in Rule 146, which was a precursor to Rule 506).  
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See supra notes 4, 110 and accompanying text (discussing the ban on 
general solicitation). 
 120. See Cable, supra note 4, at 135 (explaining how SEC regulations 
encourage use of intermediaries). 
 121. See id. (discussing SEC no-action letters). 
 122. See id. Of course, the ban on general solicitation may not affect issuer 
practices to the same extent now that it has been lifted for sales to accredited 
investors. 
 123. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (providing an overview of 
a broker–dealer’s obligation to determine that recommendations are suitable 
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The investment cap contained in the JOBS Act’s new 
crowdfunding exemption is a more explicit example of a portfolio 
mechanism. Under the new exemption, the amount each 
individual can invest in crowdfunding transactions is capped 
according to the investor’s net worth and annual income.124 For 
example, an investor with a net worth of $75,000 (and annual 
income at or below that level) can invest a maximum of $3,750 in 
crowdfunding offerings annually. An investor with a net worth of 
$750,000 (and annual income at or below that amount) can invest 
a maximum of $75,000 in crowdfunding offerings annually.125 No 
investor may purchase more than $100,000 in crowdfunding 
offerings annually regardless of wealth.126 Investment caps are 
relatively common at the state level but new to federal law.127   
Though an investment cap may not reduce the risk that any 
individual investment will fail, it may reduce an investor’s overall 
exposure to financial risk by forcing modest diversification. For 
example, assume lawmakers enact a registration exemption with 
a simple investment cap that prevents any single purchaser from 
                                                                                                     
based on a potential investor’s investment profile). 
 124. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012) (requiring issuers to adhere to an 
investment cap taking into account only sales from that issuer); id. § 77d-1(a)(8) 
(requiring crowdfunding intermediaries to ensure that a purchaser stays within 
an aggregate annual limit across all crowdfunding transactions); supra note 10 
(discussing the aggregate annual limit). 
 125. See id. § 77d(a)(6)(B). The language enacted by Congress is ambiguous 
regarding how the cap is calculated. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 
33-9470, Exchange Act Release No. 34-70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428, 66433 (Nov. 
5, 2013). The SEC takes the position that if either annual income or net worth is 
at or above $100,000, then the investor may purchase an amount equal to 10% 
of the measure that exceeded $100,000. Id. at 66433–34. But if both annual 
income and net worth are below $100,000, the SEC takes the position that the 
investor is limited to 5% of annual income or net worth (whichever is higher). 
Id. 
 126. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(c) (providing investment limits at lower income and 
net asset levels). 
 127. The investment cap in the JOBS Act resembles a provision of the 
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption adopted by several states. See, e.g., WASH. 
ADMIN. CODE § 460-44A-505 (2014) (imposing an investment cap on certain 
limited offering exemptions). This exemption allows sales to nonaccredited 
investors as long as the investment is suitable to the investor. Id. § 460-44A-
505(2)(c)(i). An investment is deemed suitable if the investment amount does 
not exceed 10% of the investor’s net worth. Id. The SEC recently proposed an 
investment cap in connection with recent revisions to Regulation A. Supra note 
38. 
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investing more than 10% of his or her net worth in a single 
company. If an angel investor with a $1 million net worth would 
otherwise invest $200,000 in a single startup, he or she might be 
forced by the investment cap to divide the investment amount 
over multiple startups or look to other types of investments (such 
as publicly traded stock or mutual funds). It is a basic tenant of 
corporate finance theory that diversification can reduce aggregate 
financial risk to an investor while maintaining returns.128 Just 
how effective diversification is at reducing risk depends on the 
nature of all assets held by the investor and their tendency to rise 
and fall in value at the same time (covariance), a topic reserved 
for Part IV.C below.129 
In addition to these diversification benefits, investment caps 
can mitigate risks associated with illiquidity. Securities issued in 
private placements are difficult to re-sell due, in part, to 
regulatory factors. When an issuer sells a security pursuant to an 
exemption from registration, only that initial sale is exempt.130 
Secondary transactions—resale by the investor to a third party—
are not automatically exempt and so investments sold in private 
placements are not eligible for most secondary markets, such as 
traditional stock exchanges where buyers and sellers are easily 
matched.131 As a result, an investor in a private placement must 
be prepared to hold the security for an extended period, 
potentially affecting his or her ability to meet current obligations. 
Investment caps can help ensure that a single, illiquid 
investment does not dominate an investor’s portfolio. 
In sum, investment caps and other portfolio mechanisms rest 
on a different logic than scaled disclosure or sorting. As stated in 
the introduction, scaled disclosure and sorting are smart-money 
approaches because they try to reduce the risk of a failed 
investment by mitigating information asymmetry (making 
                                                                                                     
 128. See infra notes 194–202 and accompanying text (discussing investment 
caps within the context of diversification and investment volatility). 
 129. See infra notes 190–97 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to 
which diversification reduces volatility). 
 130. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2014) (stating that securities sold in 
Regulation D offerings are restricted securities). 
 131. See id. § 230.144 (describing limited circumstances in which a 
purchaser of securities can re-sell restricted securities without being deemed an 
underwriter). 
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investors smarter) and limiting the market to capable (smart) 
investors.132 In contrast, investor caps and other portfolio 
mechanisms assume that there is a substantial risk of failed 
investment and try to limit the consequences for the purchaser’s 
overall financial condition.133 I refer to this as a mad-money 
approach because it anticipates and allows risky investments but 
only within parameters.134 
IV. Evaluating the Mechanisms: In Theory and Practice 
The smart-money approaches of scaled disclosure and sorting 
currently dominate private placement regulation. This Part seeks 
to understand why by first articulating a theoretical case for this 
current approach. But this Part goes on to identify practical 
considerations that seriously undermine the effectiveness of 
scaled disclosure and sorting. Taking these practical 
considerations into effect, the mad-money approach of investment 
caps becomes more appealing.  
A. The Theoretical Appeal of Disclosure and Sorting             
(Smart Money) 
To understand the current state of private placement 
regulation, it is helpful to first give smart-money approaches the 
                                                                                                     
 132. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (explaining this Article’s 
terminology of smart money). 
 133. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text (discussing the 
diversification and liquidity goals of investment caps). 
 134. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The distinction between 
smart-money approaches and investment caps bears some resemblance to 
Stephen Choi’s distinction between regulating investments and regulating 
investors. Mercer Bullard, On Regulating Investors: The JOBS Act and the 
Accredited Investor Standard 4–6 (July 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2468031 (discussing the logic of 
investment caps) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Choi has 
argued that regulators should regulate investors rather than issuers, with 
unsophisticated investors being limited to passive index funds. Stephen Choi, 
Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Approach, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
279, 300–01 (2000). While this focus on investor portfolio construction bears 
some resemblance to this Article’s analysis, Choi’s proposals rely heavily on 
sorting mechanisms that this Article disfavors. Id.   
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benefit of the doubt by assuming they are effective in achieving 
their objectives. This Part therefore assumes that scaled 
disclosure provides information that investors actually value and 
that sorting mechanisms effectively distinguish capable from 
incapable investors. This Part then compares these mechanisms 
to an investment cap that is effective in achieving its objectives of 
encouraging diversification and liquidity. This comparison 
reveals that smart-money approaches may have comparative 
advantages over investment caps in this hypothetical setting.   
1. Smart Money in a Perfect World 
At first blush, scaled disclosure seems a sensible response to 
the special attributes of private placements described above. If 
there are fixed costs to mandatory disclosure that renders it 
impractical for smaller transactions,135 perhaps the amount of 
disclosure can simply be adjusted. Through properly calibrated 
disclosure requirements, regulators could try to specify helpful, 
standardized disclosure requirements that individual market 
participants benefit from but lack adequate incentives to create 
and maintain.136 Such a regulatory scheme would advance capital 
formation and investor-choice protection in much the same way 
as the full-blown mandatory disclosure scheme for registered 
offerings.137 
But even if disclosure requirements can be scaled down in 
this manner—something this Article questions below—disclosure 
is unlikely to be the whole answer in the context of private 
placements. Unlike securities sold in registered offerings, 
securities sold in private placements are illiquid and cannot be 
re-sold through an exchange such as Nasdaq or NYSE.138 In the 
rare instances in which secondary markets for private placement 
                                                                                                     
 135. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text (discussing the fixed 
costs of mandatory disclosure). 
 136. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (identifying third-party 
effects of mandatory disclosure). 
 137. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing the 
relationship between capital formation and investor-choice protection). 
 138. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (discussing limitations 
on resales of restricted securities). 
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securities have emerged, the effectiveness of those markets in 
accurately pricing securities is questionable.139 
This illiquidity has significant implications for private 
placement regulation. One of the primary justifications for the 
mandatory disclosure system is that experts will quickly digest 
information and communicate it to the public markets through 
price.140 But without a public market, each investor must 
independently assess a company’s disclosures.141 Given the 
evidence that individual investors either exhibit flawed decision-
making or simply lack resources to process voluminous 
information,142 scaled disclosure alone is problematic.  
One problem, of course, is that vulnerable investors may be 
misled or may misconstrue information and make investments 
that they misunderstand. In that case, it is debatable whether 
those investors are satisfying their preferences in any meaningful 
way.143 
                                                                                                     
 139. For instance, Facebook stock traded on secondary markets (SharesPost 
and SecondMarket) prior to the company’s IPO. ROBERT BARTLETT, BERKELEY 
LAW, POST-JOBS ACT CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN “PRIVATE” SECONDARY 
TRADING MARKETS 17 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum111512-
materials-bartlett.pdf. Robert Bartlett determined that prices quoted on those 
secondary markets substantially exceeded issuers’ own valuations used for 
pricing stock option grants. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of newly emerging 
secondary markets and associated regulatory issues, see generally Elizabeth 
Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (2012) 
(discussing the potential benefits of, and regulatory challenges associated with, 
new secondary markets). 
 140. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing how market 
prices impound information).  
 141. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 297 (stating that “[i]nvestors cannot 
rely on pricing in . . . undeveloped markets to accurately reflect known 
information about the risk and return characteristics of the securities 
involved”). 
 142. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 204–07 (discussing cognitive biases 
displayed by investors). 
 143. See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 1042–43 (examining the policy 
implications of investors’ bounded rationality and stating that the SEC rejects 
“classical economic argument” regarding efficiency of exchange transactions 
with respect to “naïve, unsophisticated” investors); c.f. Russell Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206, 1243–44 (2003) (arguing that traditional economic 
rationales for enforcing terms of form contracts lose force when buyers are only 
boundedly rational and therefore agree to terms that fail to satisfy even their 
own preferences). 
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The presence of incapable investors may even negatively 
affect capable investors by creating incentives for fraud and 
misinformation, counter to the goals of capital formation and 
investor-choice protection. When there are a large number of 
incapable investors in the market, companies may turn their 
efforts to hard sales tactics designed to influence unsophisticated 
investors, rather than providing the more meaningful 
information demanded by sophisticated investors. As Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explain: 
[I]t is possible that . . . promoters may find the gains from 
deception greater than the reputational loss. This is especially 
likely if the public contains a pool of persons who cannot 
evaluate information and therefore cannot tell good projects 
from bad. Call them suckers. If there are enough suckers, 
sellers may make a living dealing exclusively with them, 
abandoning all prospects of sales to the informed. It follows 
that some firms will find fraud to be the project with the 
highest net present value.144 
At some level of pervasive misinformation, we might expect 
capable investors to simply drop out of the market, as 
distinguishing good from bad investments becomes too costly.145 A 
sorting mechanism potentially counteracts this harmful dynamic 
by limiting the market to capable investors least susceptible to 
fraud and removing the “suckers.”146 
                                                                                                     
 144. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 281. 
 145. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 674 (“A world with fraud, 
or without adequate truthful information, is a world with too little investment, 
and in the wrong things to boot.”). 
 146. It may seem implausible that sorting mechanisms could have much 
effect on fraud because a determined fraudster may simply disregard private 
placement regulations and sell to whomever he or she considers a good mark.  
Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. 
CINCINNATI L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2000) (discussing why mandatory disclosure may 
be ineffective against fraud). But evidence suggests fraud is not a binary choice, 
and that “honest cheaters” may engage in what they perceive as minor 
transgressions while largely complying with other legal requirements to 
maintain their self-image as honest people. Michael D. Guttentag, Stumbling 
into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Corporate Fraud, in HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 205, 211 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012) 
5–7 (discussing work of Dan Ariely and others). Also, even a determined and 
blatant fraudster might comply with private placement exemptions while 
committing fraud if he or she believes that a registration exemption would be 
relatively easy to prove while a fraud claim would be more difficult for victims to 
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Sorting mechanisms and scaled disclosure are therefore a 
theoretically appealing combination for regulating private 
placements. Scaled disclosure is strongly consistent with the goal 
of capital formation to the extent that it corrects a failure in the 
market for disclosure and therefore draws additional investors 
into the market.147 While sorting does eliminate some sources of 
financing, there are offsetting benefits to capital formation if 
eliminating incapable investors improves the overall quality of 
information in the market by reducing incentives for fraud.148 
A combination of scaled disclosure and sorting might also be 
strongly consistent with at least two varieties of investor 
protection. Scaled disclosure is strongly consistent with investor-
choice protection if it helps investors satisfy their preferences by 
providing capable investors with better information than they 
reasonably could obtain through their own efforts.149 While 
sorting may at first appear inconsistent with investor-choice 
protection by excluding some people from the market, a truly 
effective sorting mechanism would exclude only those incapable 
of making informed investment choices and it is unclear how 
much weight ought to be given to facilitating uninformed 
investing, particularly if it has a deleterious effect on the overall 
quality of information and drives some capable investors out of 
the market.150 Sorting mechanisms are in obvious tension with 
populist investor protection (by excluding many investors entirely 
from private placements). 
Table 2 recaps these theoretical strengths of scaled disclosure 
and sorting. In sum, a combination of scaled disclosure and 
sorting is strongly consistent with capital formation and two of 
                                                                                                     
prove because of subjective elements such as scienter and materiality. 
 147. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (explaining how scaled 
disclosure might advance capital formation). 
 148. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (discussing how 
effective sorting potentially reduces incentives to defraud). 
 149. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (discussing how scaled 
disclosure could advance investor-choice protection). 
 150. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (describing how a 
market with high levels of fraud could push out sophisticated investors); supra 
note 143 (suggesting that traditional economic justifications may be less 
compelling when investors appear to be making mistakes that do not reflect 
their true preferences). 
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three forms of investor protection—investor-choice and 
paternalistic. 
2. Investment Caps in a Perfect World 
Even if investment caps function well (encouraging 
diversification and liquidity), they have an ambiguous 
relationship with the goals of securities regulation. In terms of 
investor protection, caps are comparable to effective scaled 
disclosure and sorting, albeit with slightly different strengths and 
weaknesses. In contrast to scaled disclosure and sorting, 
investment caps are moderately aligned with the goal of populist 
investor protection by allowing everyone at least some access to 
private placements. Like scaled disclosure and sorting, an 
effective cap strongly advances paternalistic investor protection—
though by mitigating the consequences of failed investments, 
rather than preventing failed investments.151 Where investment 
caps seem inferior to well-functioning sorting and scaled 
disclosure is investor-choice protection. A cap may prevent even 
capable investors from fully satisfying their preferences. In other 
words, “grandma” may in fact be a savvy financial thrill seeker, 
and her large investment in a startup might have been wealth 
maximizing.152 
For related reasons, investment caps are in some tension 
with capital formation, at least relative to well-functioning 
sorting and scaled disclosure. Limiting the autonomy of risk-
preferring investors may drive up issuers’ transaction costs by 
increasing the number of investors required for a given financing; 
in some cases, it may prevent a financing from happening 
altogether. 
There is a silver lining for investment caps and the related 
goals of capital formation and investor-choice protection. Like 
sorting, portfolio mechanisms might helpfully change the 
                                                                                                     
 151. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (contrasting smart-money 
approaches and investment caps).  
 152. There is a tradition of referring to vulnerable or impressionable 
investors as grandma. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 115, at 994 (“Grandma, and 
her money, are in need of protection”). In truth, this author’s grandmothers 
were especially financially savvy. 
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equation for fraud. In deciding whether to engage in fraud, a 
calculating fraudster presumably balances the cost of identifying 
and luring victims against the potential payoffs.153 By requiring a 
fraudster to lure more victims for the same aggregate payoff, 
compelled diversification may drive some fraudsters to instead 
pursue legitimate business projects or scams not involving 
securities, thereby advancing capital formation and investor-
choice protection by improving the overall quality of information 
in the market.154 For this reason, one could describe portfolio 
mechanisms as moderately aligned with capital formation and 
investor-choice protection. 
Table 2 recaps these theoretical strengths and weaknesses of 
investment caps and compares caps to smart-money approaches. 
In sum, investment caps compare reasonably well on investor-
protection grounds (albeit with different strengths and 
weaknesses than smart-money approaches), but have a more 
ambiguous relationship to capital formation.  
B. The Practical Problem of Universality 
Despite their superior theoretical appeal, scaled-disclosure 
and sorting prove difficult to implement effectively. This Part 
describes those difficulties and focuses on one potential cause—
the broad range of investment products governed by private 
placement regulations.  
1. Universality and the Failure of Scaled Disclosure 
Issuers rarely use exemptions that require scaled disclosure. 
Regulation A’s disclosure requirements, while less demanding 
than a registered public offering, are considered too onerous.155 
                                                                                                     
 153. See Cormac Herley, Why Do Nigerian Scammers Say They Are From 
Nigeria?, MICROSOFT RESEARCH, http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/ 
default.aspx?id=167719 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (discussing the “per-target” 
effort of financial scammers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 154. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (describing how sorting 
may reduce fraud and improve information). 
 155. See Campbell, supra note 104, at 82–83 (proposing reforms to 
Regulation A).  
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Similarly, issuers customarily limit Rule 506 offerings to 
accredited investors in order to avoid the disclosure requirements 
triggered by sales to non-accredited investors.156  
The infrequent use of scaled-disclosure mechanisms suggests 
the approach has failed in its goal of overcoming market failures. 
Investors do not seem to value information that the SEC requires 
for these exemptions. Put another way, the required disclosure is 
not what investors would bargain for in the absence of market 
failure.   
The failure of scaled disclosure pushes activity to exemptions 
that rely heavily on sorting mechanisms,157 but commentators 
express doubt that those exemptions effectively protect investors. 
In particular, increasing reliance on the accredited-investor 
standard is puzzling. In addition to the criticism that the income 
and net worth standards are in need of adjustment—they are 
largely unchanged since the early 1980s—there is a more 
fundamental question as to whether those standards are 
meaningful proxies for investment capability.158  
If scaled-disclosure and sorting mechanisms are flawed in 
practice, there are a number of possible explanations. Scholars 
variously charge that Congress and regulators are susceptible to 
interest-group pressure, lack proper incentives, suffer from 
cognitive limitations, or too easily fall prey to the wrong 
ideology.159 This Article focuses on a different regulatory 
                                                                                                     
 156. See Johnson, supra note 115, at 1002 n.56 (citing a study indicating 
that over 90% of Regulation D offerings are limited to accredited investors).  
 157. See id. (discussing the popularity of Regulation D offerings that are 
limited to accredited investors). 
 158. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 291, 299 (suggesting that the 
accredited-investor standard leaves wealthy but unsophisticated investors 
vulnerable); Jennifer Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Blackhole, 35 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 191–92 nn.242–43 (2010) (arguing that “there is also a 
growing recognition that the accredited-investor standard provides insufficient 
protection for investors”); Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The 
Elusive Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings 
of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 22 (1998) (questioning the 
relationship between wealth standards and financial sophistication); Greg 
Oguss, Note, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal Securities 
Laws?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 288–90, 301–09 (2012) (cataloguing criticisms of 
the accredited-investor definition and providing recent case studies of fraud 
allegations by institutional investors). 
 159. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 671 (discussing interest-
group pressure and securities law); M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay 
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challenge: the broad range of investment products Congress and 
the SEC are trying to regulate.  
For the most part, exemptions are not tied to specific kinds of 
issuers. Investment in an oil and gas partnership is subject to the 
same rules as investment in a high-tech startup, a private 
offering of public-company stock (a PIPE transaction), or a worm 
farm.160 In describing the wide range of financial arrangements 
subject to regulation as securities, a leading treatise states: “The 
catalogue of these schemes is as variegated as the imaginations of 
promoters.”161  
This attempt to address a wide variety of investment types 
through one set of rules—what I call “universality”—complicates 
development of scaled-disclosure requirements. Simply put, 
different types of information are relevant to different investment 
products.   
Consider two investments typically offered to individuals 
through private placement offerings: oil and gas partnerships and 
angel investments in high-tech startup companies.162 Oil and gas 
partnerships are formed by promoters who identify, develop, and 
manage drilling projects.163 The promoters fund their projects by 
soliciting investment from wealthy individuals who will be 
passive investors.164 Angel investors are individuals who invest in 
                                                                                                     
for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1031–40 (2012) (discussing 
incentives of regulators); Choi, supra note 75, at 317–19 (discussing cognitive 
biases of regulators); Friedman, supra note 14, at 291–93 (discussing the 
influence of ideology on regulators). 
 160. See Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that an 
interest in a worm farm constituted a security); Oguss, supra note 158, at 310–
11 (noting the “tremendous range of contemporary investment products” and the 
associated difficulty of devising any single “financial literacy exam”); supra note 
29 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of a security under federal 
law).  
 161. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 246–64 (5th ed. 2004). 
 162. The angel investment market is estimated at $25 billion annually. 
Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 1419 n.57. The market for private placement oil and 
gas partnerships is approximately $700 million annually. See KATHY HESHELOW, 
INVESTING IN OIL & GAS: THE ABCS OF DPPS (2d ed. 2010) (providing an estimate 
for “private placement drilling programs” in 2005).  
 163. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 98–108 (explaining how oil and gas 
partnerships are established). 
 164. Id. at 8–11. See JOHN ORBAN, III, MONEY IN THE GROUND: INSIDER’S 
GUIDE TO OIL & GAS DEALS 177–96 (4th ed. 2006) (explaining how funding is 
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high-growth startups, typically after a company’s founders have 
exhausted personal resources but before these companies are 
established enough to obtain venture capital.165 
At some level of generalization, the same types of 
information may be relevant to both investments. In both cases, 
investors will presumably seek information about the promoters’ 
(or founders’) prior track record and expertise, the anticipated 
costs of the project, and projected returns.166 But at the level of 
specificity that informs actual investment decisions, relevant 
information will be quite different. For example, the projected 
cost of an oil and gas drilling project is driven largely by 
geological and technical factors, such as anticipated well depth 
and drilling conditions, which are inapposite to an investment in 
a technology startup. 167 Conversely, projected returns for a high 
growth startup are driven by the size of the potential market for 
a new product and the ability to capture a large share of that 
market through intellectual property rights and besting potential 
competitors, none of which is obviously relevant to a drilling 
operation.168 
Note that the type of historical information required by most 
scaled-disclosure mechanisms, such as financial statements, is 
not particularly important to evaluating either investment 
opportunity.169 That is not to say, however, that historical 
financial information is never important to investors. A key 
employee who is offered the opportunity to invest in his or her 
privately owned employer, for example, would likely value 
information about past and current profitability and the extent of 
                                                                                                     
obtained for oil and gas projects).  
 165. See Cable, supra note 4, at 108–17 (providing an overview of angel 
investing); Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 1416–25 (describing angel investing). 
 166. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 98–108 (identifying information 
relevant to selecting an oil and gas partnership investment); MAYNARD & 
WARREN, supra note 115, at 9–10, 235, 461 (describing topics expected to be 
covered in a startup company business plan seeking outside investment). 
 167. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 100–02 (listing factors that are 
considered in projecting the costs of a drilling project). 
 168. See MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 115, at 9–10, 235, 461 (explaining 
factors that are considered in projecting the return on investment in a startup 
company). 
 169. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing informational 
requirements of Regulation A and Rule 506 of Regulation D). 
2294 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2253 (2014) 
past distributions to equity holders. The point is that crafting 
universally relevant disclosure standards at the level of 
specificity necessary to substantially aid investors is daunting. 
One might object that this argument proves too much—the 
baseline rule of mandatory disclosure for public offerings also 
applies across a wide range of investment products. Public 
equities markets include issuers in distinct industries offering 
securities with distinct features, and the system seems to 
function well enough. Why doesn’t the problem of universality 
similarly plague public offerings? In fact, some mandatory 
disclosure requirements imposed by the SEC are industry 
specific.170 More generally, the accounting profession often 
develops standards tailored to particular industries, which shape 
the audited financial statements required in connection with 
public offerings.171 In other words, the SEC mostly delegates the 
task of developing industry-specific disclosure to the accounting 
profession. This same approach has not proven effective in the 
private placement context, presumably because historical 
financial information is often less important to the types of 
businesses that rely on private placements and because obtaining 
audited financials represents a fixed cost that may be 
disproportionate to smaller private placements.172  
2. Universality and the Failure of Sorting 
Universality is not just a problem for scaled disclosure. It 
also poses a challenge for sorting mechanisms.173 Policymakers 
                                                                                                     
 170. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.1100 (2014) (imposing special disclosure 
requirements with respect to securitization assets in Regulation AB); id. § 210.9.   
(imposing special disclosure requirements on bank holding companies in Article 
9 of Regulation S-X); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2012) (subjecting mutual funds 
to a separate statutory scheme through the Investment Company Act of 1940); 
Guttentag, supra note 50, at 178–79 (discussing industry-specific disclosure 
requirements imposed on publicly traded companies in the oil and gas sector).     
 171. See generally ERNST & YOUNG, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 
985–605, SOFTWARE–REVENUE RECOGNITION (2014) (describing accounting 
principles for recognizing revenue from software licensing agreements). 
 172. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text (explaining that the cost 
of disclosures may not be proportionate to the size of a firm or offering). 
 173. See Oguss, supra note 158, at 310–11 (“[F]inancial literacy can mean 
very different things in different contexts . . . . Accordingly, it is hard to imagine 
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sometimes equate investor sophistication with general financial 
literacy.174 But this focus misses an important component of 
investor capability—familiarity with conventions that vary 
significantly across different investment products.    
In a previous article, for example, I described the 
conventional set of contract terms and practices angel investors 
use to mitigate the extreme information asymmetry, uncertainty, 
and agency costs associated with startups.175 Among those 
conventional contractual terms are receipt of corporate preferred 
stock176 and—less frequently—representation on a corporate 
board of directors.177  
Investors in oil and gas projects also face significant 
information asymmetry, uncertainly, and agency costs, yet 
conventional investment terms in this context are quite different 
from an angel investment. For one, drilling projects are typically 
organized as “pass-through” entities—limited liability companies 
or limited partnerships—rather than the corporate form used for 
angel investments in startups.178 In addition, oil and gas 
investors and promoters receive distributions of cash as soon as 
the project begins generating profits, while angel investors and 
                                                                                                     
any one exam of a reasonable length that could accurately measure an investor’s 
or a purchaser representative’s relevant knowledge in all such contexts.”). 
 174. See Willis, supra note 71, at 199–203 (discussing increased efforts to 
promote financial literacy).   
 175. See Cable, supra note 4, at 124–31 (describing how venture capital and 
angel investors use preferred stock, board representation, negative covenants, 
and other mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry). 
 176. Preferred stock gives investors (a) financial preferences over the 
founders in the case of a company failure and (b) conversion into common stock 
in the event of an IPO or trade sale. The financial preference might serve a 
useful signaling function because only a founder who is confident in their 
abilities would agree to it. See id. at 124–25 (“By agreeing to the liquidation 
preference for the V[enture] C[apital] fund, but accepting common stock for 
themselves, entrepreneurs may be signaling their confidence . . . .”). The 
conversion of preferred stock into common at an IPO may reflect a bargain to 
return control to the founders once the period of greatest uncertainly has 
passed. See id. at 124–27 (discussing the work of Ronald Gilson, George 
Triantis, and others). 
 177. Board representation allows angel investors to monitor the progress of 
the founders in achieving their business plans. See id. at 125.   
 178. This significantly affects the accounting and tax treatment of the 
project’s operations. HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 8–9; ORBAN, supra note 164, 
at 161–75. 
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startup company founders typically receive a return on their 
investment only when the company is sold or achieves an initial 
public offering.179 
A number of contextual differences account for these 
contrasting investment conventions. The choice of entity is likely 
explained by tax law, which is especially favorable to oil and gas 
exploration.180 The timing of cash distributions reflects 
fundamental differences in the nature of the underlying business 
ventures. An oil and gas drilling project is a depleting asset that 
generates cash flows relatively quickly with limited additional 
capital after an initial investment in equipment and evaluation of 
the prospect.181 A high-growth startup, in contrast, ordinarily 
requires ongoing capital investment (including reinvestment of 
any early profits) to develop the kinds of products, and achieve 
the scale, necessary for an initial public offering or profitable 
acquisition.182 
For the purposes of this Article, the critical point is only that 
investing conventions vary significantly across investment 
products. We cannot assume that a savvy angel investor is also a 
savvy investor in oil and gas partnerships. Investment 
experience, and therefore sophistication, is context specific. 
                                                                                                     
 179. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 97–101 (suggesting that oil and gas 
partnerships begin distributing cash as early as six months after investment 
and can completely “pay out” in two to three years).   
 180. Pass-through entities are generally superior to corporations for tax 
purposes because they avoid double taxation. Angel investors, however, may 
agree to a corporate form because subsequent venture-capital investors prefer 
them (for their own somewhat esoteric tax reasons) and because the benefits of 
pass-through treatment may be diminished by the alternative minimum tax. See 
MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 115, at 112–28 (detailing the tax advantages of 
various business entities). Oil and gas partnerships receive beneficial tax 
treatment that avoids the alternative minimum tax problem. HESHELOW, supra 
note 162, at 89–93. 
 181. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 118 (explaining the financing and 
revenue structure of a drilling project). 
 182. See Cable, supra note 44, at 229 (explaining the importance of 
scalability to venture-capital investors).  
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3. The Result: Counterproductive Smart-Money Approaches 
The historical failures of scaled disclosure and sorting have 
important implications. Specifically, the comparison of theoretical 
strengths described in Part IV.A and Table 2 is not the most 
helpful exercise for guiding policy. Instead, it is necessary to 
evaluate smart-money approaches in their inevitably flawed 
states. Viewed this way, scaled disclosure and sorting are not 
only less effective than they originally appear; they are 
potentially counter-productive.   
Capital formation is hindered by scaled disclosure that 
compels information investors do not value. Such compelled 
disclosure becomes an additional transaction cost rather than a 
solution to a market failure.183 At the margins, this additional 
transaction cost may drive some potential investors in a private 
offering to other investment opportunities. 
Capital formation may also suffer from ineffective sorting 
mechanisms. Recall that effective sorting mechanisms—those 
that accurately distinguish between capable and incapable 
investors—might help quality issuers by eliminating noise from 
the market and reducing incentives for misinformation.184 In 
contrast, sorting mechanisms based on wealth standards alone 
may do the opposite by identifying and leaving unprotected ideal 
candidates for fraud—wealthy but unsophisticated investors.185 
The dynamic is similar to that observed in a paper popularized by 
Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner in their recent book Think 
Like a Freak.186 Dubner and Levitt describe the work of a 
Microsoft researcher asserting that e-mail scammers identify 
themselves as being from Nigeria (a well-known origin for such 
scams) to reduce their costs of identifying and luring viable 
                                                                                                     
 183. See Guttentag, supra note 50, at 163–64 (describing the cost of 
“regulatory waste”).  
 184. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (describing how sorting 
may reduce fraud and improve information). 
 185. Studies suggest that targets of securities fraud have relatively high 
incomes compared to the general population and victims of other types of fraud, 
supporting the intuition that a fraudster will prefer deep pockets to maximize 
payoffs. KARLA PAK & DOUG SHADEL, AARP FOUNDATION NATIONAL FRAUD VICTIM 
STUDY 4 (2011). 
 186. See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, THINK LIKE A FREAK 154–
61 (2014) (describing research by Cormac Herley).  
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victims.187 By responding to an e-mail originating from Nigeria, 
the potential victim self-identifies as gullible or uninformed about 
email scams.188 Analogously, the accredited-investor concept may 
help perpetrators of securities fraud efficiently target deep-
pocketed victims by legitimizing inquiries into wealth. In some 
cases, the current regulatory scheme even encourages wealthy 
investors to helpfully serve themselves up on a silver platter by 
organizing into standing databases of accredited investors.189  
Investor protections are also predictably weakened when 
scaled disclosure produces the wrong information and sorting 
fails to identify incapable investors. Investors are not aided in 
satisfying their preferences—in fact, some preferred investments 
are made too expensive by arbitrary disclosure requirements and 
some perfectly capable, but not wealthy, investors are excluded 
from the market altogether. Such a regime also does little to stop 
incapable investors from making mistakes and perhaps 
emboldens some wealthy but unsophisticated investors by 
deeming them accredited.  
Table 3 summarizes the weak performance of ineffective 
smart-money approaches across all goals of securities law. 
C. The Case for Investment Caps (Mad Money) 
Of course, the fact that scaled disclosure and sorting are 
difficult to implement does not by itself mean those mechanisms 
are inferior to investment caps and other portfolio mechanisms. 
                                                                                                     
 187. See id. at 157–59 (describing the costs of luring victims and of “false-
positives”); Herley, supra note 153 (discussing the costs to a scammer of 
identifying victims). 
 188. See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 186, at 159–61 (discussing how 
scammers cause gullible victims to reveal themselves). 
 189. For example, a company named American Direct Marketing Services, 
Inc. offers access to such a database. ADMS’ Accredited Investors, ADMS, 
http://www.dmlist.com/direct-mail-telemarketing-lists/adms’-accredited-
investors#sthash.6nxWh6Di.dpuf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). In promoting sale of the list, the site 
explains: “$1,000,000 minimum net worth separates the Accredited Investor 
from the other 96.4% of America’s investing public. ADMS’ Accredited Investor 
database will position the financial services marketer in a specifically attractive 
universe of high net worth investors and major market players capable of 
making five and six figure investments.” Id. 
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To make the case for portfolio mechanisms, one has to show that 
they are less affected by universality than smart-money 
approaches. To that end, this Part V.C considers how investment 
caps perform when taking into account implementation 
challenges posed by universality. 
With respect to the goals of capital formation, investor-choice 
protection, and populist protection, it is hard to see how the broad 
scope of private placement regulation has much effect. For 
example, recall that even a perfectly effective investment cap (one 
that ensures diversification and liquidity) has mixed effects on 
the goal of capital formation and the highly correlated goal of 
investor-choice protection. By its nature, a cap reduces some risk-
preferring investors’ range of choice and potentially drives up an 
issuer’s cost of capital.190 On the other hand, an investment cap 
also drives up the cost of fraud and may improve the overall 
quality of information.191 Universality does not appear to change 
these results. Even a cap that totally fails in its objectives of 
diversification and liquidity still potentially increases the costs of 
both legitimate and illegitimate capital raising. These steady 
results stand in contrast to the current accredited-investor 
definition, which in theory reduces incentives to defraud but, in 
fact, may create a perfect storm of wealthy and unsophisticated 
investors without substantial protections.192   
That is not to say that universality has no effect on 
investment caps. As described above, the strength of an effective 
investment cap is its strong paternalistic protection of investors 
through diversification and liquidity.193 Universality is likely a 
significant, but not insurmountable, challenge for achieving 
meaningful diversification.  
Because of universality, a simple investment cap encourages 
only modest diversification and does not ensure the greater 
benefits achievable through a sophisticated asset allocation 
strategy. Finance professors and securities professionals suggest 
that an optimal investment portfolio would not only include 
                                                                                                     
 190. Supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 191. Supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 185, 189 and accompanying text (discussing how 
current regulations affect incentives to defraud). 
 193. Supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
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investments in several different companies, but also investments 
in different industries, asset classes (stocks, bonds, and cash), 
and geographic markets (U.S. and non-U.S.).194 In other words, 
an investor whose entire asset portfolio consists of stock in fifty 
social media startups headquartered in Palo Alto is not as well 
diversified as an investor who spreads fifty investments over 
companies of varying sizes, industries, and geographic location. 
The goal of a sophisticated asset allocation strategy is to hold a 
large number of investments with low “covariance,” meaning the 
investments do not have parallel returns.195  
The importance of covariance is often illustrated through the 
type of highly stylized example that follows.196 Assume that an 
investor plans to purchase $100,000 of Security A sold in a 
private placement. Assume that on average Security A has a 
positive expected return but that it is risky (volatile) in the sense 
of having potential for either big losses or big gains.197 Now 
suppose the investor has the opportunity to instead invest half of 
the $100,000 in a new security. If the value of the new security is 
perfectly positively correlated with Security A, so that the new 
security increases and decreases in value in parallel to Security 
A, the investor will not decrease risk through diversification.198 In 
contrast, the investor can eliminate risk altogether if the new 
security is perfectly negatively correlated with Security A, so that 
the new security always declines in value when Security A 
                                                                                                     
 194. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 206–14 (discussing the benefits of 
diversification); DAVID F. SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL 
APPROACH TO INVESTING 16–17, 22 (same); THE VANGUARD GROUP, INC., 
VANGUARD’S PRINCIPLES FOR INVESTING SUCCESS, 12–16 (2014) 
http://www.vanguard.com/pdf/s700.pdf (discussing the benefits of diversification 
across asset classes). 
 195. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 204 (describing the concept of 
covariance); SWENSON, supra note 194, at 16–17 (explaining the importance of 
diversification). 
 196. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 202–06 (explaining modern portfolio 
theory through the example of an island economy with two potential 
investments); Risk and Return: Diversification, COLUMBIA BUS. SCH. PREMBA 
FIN., https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/premba/finance/s6/s6_5.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2014) (providing an example of a two-stock portfolio) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 197. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 196–202 (identifying volatility as a 
measure of financial risk). 
 198. Id. at 202–06.  
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increases in value and the new security always increases in value 
when Security A decreases in value.199 It is hard to imagine such 
perfect positive correlation or perfect negative correlation, and 
real-life examples fall somewhere in between.200 The important 
point is that diversification will provide some risk reduction at 
anything less than perfect positive correlation, but a more 
effective diversification strategy requires judgments about the 
degree of correlation between investments.201 This discussion of 
covariance is good and bad news for investment caps. The bad 
news is that optimal diversification would require regulators to 
categorize every potential investment and to understand its 
relationship to every other asset held by the investor. The broad 
range of investment types that private placement regulations 
encompass likely renders this task impossible. But the good news 
is that imperfect diversification still makes a difference.202 
Ensuring that no single investment in a private placement 
dominates an investor’s portfolio is a sound, if modest, objective. 
Furthermore, an investment cap’s other objective of liquidity 
seems mostly unfazed by universality. It is reasonable to presume 
that any private placement is going to be relatively hard to 
convert into cash. This is a valid presumption across all types of 
private placements because illiquidity is a regulatory 
consequence of private placement status, rather than an intrinsic 
quality that differs across investment products. Under applicable 
law, securities initially sold in private placements cannot be 
                                                                                                     
 199. As an example of negatively correlated investments, a leading corporate 
finance text discusses a hypothetical beach resort that thrives on sunny days 
and raincoat factory that thrives when it rains. Id. at 203. 
 200. Id. at 205. 
 201. Id. at 206 (“Now comes the real kicker; negative correlation is not 
necessary to achieve the reduction of benefits from diversification.”). The 
marginal effect on volatility decreases with each security added. See id. at 207. 
Some suggest that the bulk of diversification’s benefits are achieved with a 
portfolio of approximately fifty stocks, assuming the portfolio is limited to U.S. 
equities. See id. (summarizing various studies). Others suggest that a larger 
number of stocks is necessary for optimal diversification. See WILLIAM K.S. 
WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 3.3.6 n.81 (2d ed. 2008) (reviewing 
evidence that most investors are not diversified). 
 202. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 576 (“[A]nything less than perfect 
positive correlation can potentially reduce risk.”).    
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resold freely on securities markets.203 They are therefore illiquid 
by law. 
Of course, liquidity is a relative concept and it is conceptually 
possible that a particular private placement investment would 
improve liquidity of a particular investor’s portfolio because the 
investor’s beginning position is extremely illiquid. But data on 
household wealth suggests that this scenario is unlikely. The 
major categories of assets that most American families report 
owning—real estate204 and retirement accounts205—fall 
somewhere in the middle of the liquidity spectrum. One can often 
sell or borrow real estate, though with delay and expense; one can 
also borrow against or withdraw from many types of retirement 
plans, though usually with tax penalties.206 While reducing these 
commonly held assets to cash is not effortless, it is hard to see 
how adding private placements to the mix likely improves 
liquidity. 
In sum, this analysis confirms the intuition that containing 
risk through investment caps has practical advantages over 
trying to engineer each transaction to be safe. Like securities 
professionals who categorize private placements as “alternative” 
or “non-core” assets that should represent only a limited portion 
(0% to 25%) of an investor’s portfolio,207 investment caps 
                                                                                                     
 203. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (describing restrictions 
on re-sale). 
 204. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (describing census data 
regarding household wealth). 
 205. The Federal Reserve collects data on financial asset ownership. U.S. 
Fed. Reserve Bd., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence 
from the Survey of Consumer Fins., 98 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 24–31 (June 
2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf. With 50% 
of households reporting ownership of a retirement account, such accounts are 
the second most commonly held financial asset, with only transaction accounts 
(i.e., bank accounts) ranking higher. Id. Retirement accounts average 38% of 
household wealth. Id. 
 206. See Janet Novack, 11 Ways To Tap Retirement Cash Early, Without a 
10% Penalty, (Jan. 15, 2013, 3:56 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/ 
2013/01/15/11-ways-to-tap-retirement-cash-early-without-a-10-penalty/ (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2014) (recommending strategies to withdraw retirement funds 
without tax penalties) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 207. See SWENSEN, supra note 194, at 92–93 (discussing non-core asset 
classes, such as investments in venture-capital funds); HESHELOW, supra note 
162, at 92–93 (describing oil and gas partnerships as alternative asset classes); 
U.S. TRUST, ASSET ALLOCATION AND ANGEL INVESTING (Feb. 24, 2005) (describing 
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recognize that risk ultimately depends not only on the 
characteristics of a particular security but also its place in a 
broader investment portfolio. By setting some basic parameters 
for investors’ portfolio construction, Congress and the SEC can 
provide modest yet meaningful risk mitigation without perfect 
knowledge.  
V. A Proposal 
The first four Parts of this Article made the case for 
investment caps. Though effective smart-money approaches have 
theoretical advantages over investment caps, sorting and scaled 
disclosure are difficult to implement over the broad range of 
investment products to which private placement regulations 
apply. This problem of universality suggests that investment caps 
should constitute the core of private placement regulations. This 
Part outlines a specific proposal for implementing investment 
caps, and then addresses potential objections.  
A. The Scope 
The investment-cap proposal outlined below would replace 
safe-harbor exemptions in current Regulation D, including but 
not limited to Rule 506. As a safe-harbor exemption, the proposal 
would not be the exclusive means to avoid registration obligations 
under the ’33 Act. An issuer could complete a transaction in 
excess of the investment cap and still take the position that the 
sale complied with Section 4(a)(2) of the ’33 Act and related case 
law because of the purchaser’s clear ability to fend for itself. In 
this vein, publicly traded companies frequently issue debt to 
institutional investors in private placements.208 Under current 
                                                                                                     
angel investments as alternative investments and suggesting that alternative 
assets represent 0–25% of an investor’s portfolio, private equity represent 20–
60% of alternative investments, angel investments represent no more than 50% 
of private equity, and the amount allocated to angel investing should be divided 
among 5 to 10 individual investments) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).   
 208. See Guttentag, supra note 50, at 151 n.125 (explaining the private debt 
market and the disclosure demands of participating investors). 
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law, issuers do sometimes rely on the Rule 506 safe harbor for 
these transactions, but in other instances issuers take the 
position that these transactions comply with Section 4(a)(2) 
without expressly relying on the safe harbor.209 Similarly, the 
proposal does not preclude reliance on Section 4(a)(2) when there 
is no significant question about the ability of purchasers to fend 
for themselves, such as sales of stock to venture-capital funds and 
corporate-debt offerings to institutional buyers. The proposal will 
have its greatest effect on modestly sized offerings to individuals, 
where the Regulation D safe harbors have their greatest value 
because sophistication of the purchasers is less certain and 
litigation risk is higher.210 
Moreover, the proposal does not preclude use of scaled 
disclosure and sorting in future safe harbors. Those mechanisms 
may have a role in exemptions that are limited to specific 
investment contexts or products. For example, I previously 
proposed an exemption specifically tailored to angel investments 
in startup companies.211 The exemption would have employed 
                                                                                                     
 209. These offerings are often referred to as “144A offerings.” See LLOYD S. 
HARMETZ, MORRISON FOERSTER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT RULE 
144A, at 1 (2009), http://media.mofo.com/docs/pdf/faqrule144a.pdf. (providing a 
general overview of Rule 144A). Rule 144A exempts resales of securities to 
“qualified institutional buyers” who meet financial standards far more 
demanding than accredited investor status. See id. (describing qualifications for 
investment in Rule 144A offerings). Because 144A is an exemption for resales 
(but is not available to issuers for initial sales), a 144A offering first relies on 
either § 4(a)(2) or Rule 506 for an initial sale (often to a financial intermediary) 
and then Rule 144A for subsequent resales. See id. (“Any person other than an 
issuer may rely on Rule 144A. Issuers must find another exemption for the offer 
and sale of unregistered securities. Typically they rely on Section 4(2) (often in 
reliance on Regulation D) or Regulation S under the Securities Act.”); SCOTT 
BAUGUESS & VLADIMIR I. IVANOV, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION 2 (2012) 
(suggesting that the first leg of a 144A exemption typically relies on Section 
4(a)(2)). 
 210. See BAUGUESS & IVANOV, supra note 209, at 3, 11–12 (reporting, based 
on an empirical study of Form D filings, that Regulation D is most frequently 
used for offerings of below $2 million by non-financial issuers, though large 
offerings by financial issuers do account for a large percentage of the total dollar 
value of Regulation D offerings). 
 211. The proposed exemption would have been available only to privately 
held operating companies—not publicly traded companies conducting PIPE 
offerings, real estate partnerships, hedge funds, or similar investment vehicles. 
See Cable, supra note 4, at 168–72 (explaining the scope of the proposed reform). 
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sorting mechanisms based on a profile of angel investors with 
demonstrated success in mitigating the challenges of investing in 
startup companies.212 Policy makers should continue to consider 
such context-specific exemptions where possible—this Article 
recognizes that effective smart-money approaches may have 
advantages over investment caps. It would be impractical, 
however, to rely on a collection of context-specific exemptions as 
the only safe harbors from registration. Investment products 
come, go, and evolve, and we cannot wait for Congress or the SEC 
to address each investment product separately.  
B. The Details 
While this Article’s analysis points in the general direction of 
investment caps, the devil will always be in the details. In that 
spirit, this subpart outlines a more specific proposal. The 
proposed cap would subject an investment to two separate tests: 
one to encourage diversification and one to encourage liquidity.   
1. A Diversification Test 
An investor would be considered diversified if he or she 
limited a particular private placement investment to a specific 
percentage (2.5%, for example) of the investor’s gross assets. 
Use of gross, as opposed to net, assets is a departure from 
current investment caps.213 The proposal takes this approach 
because high levels of debt, while posing some potential risk to 
                                                                                                     
 212. The proposal would have eliminated the ban on general solicitation and 
relieved intermediaries (such as “finders”) from broker–dealer or investment 
adviser regulation so long as all investors met both the current accredited 
investor standard and at least one additional qualification. Id. The additional 
qualifications included experience as an investor or experience as an 
entrepreneur, reflecting the important role that entrepreneurial (as opposed to 
financial) experience appears to play in selecting angel investments. Id. 
Entrepreneurial experience would have been demonstrated by participation in a 
Rule 506 offering as an executive officer of the issuer, while financial experience 
would have been demonstrated by ownership or management of at least $1.5 
million in investments (roughly corresponding to the average angel investor 
portfolio). Id. 
 213. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text (describing investment 
caps under current law). 
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investors, are not necessarily relevant to whether an investor is 
appropriately diversified.214 
This diversification test also departs from the JOBS Act cap 
by applying only to the amount purchased from a particular 
issuer, rather than imposing an aggregate cap for all private 
placements.215 For diversification purposes, the primary focus is 
dividing purchases among different issuers; any limit on 
aggregate exposure to private placements is better addressed 
under the liquidity test below. 
One can imagine a more sophisticated diversification 
measure that would take into account covariance.216 Such a 
measure would require categorizing not only the new investment, 
but also the existing assets of the purchaser that serve as the 
“denominator” for purposes of the specified percentage. For 
instance, census data on household wealth indicates that 
ownership of personal residences and investment real estate 
represent a significant portion of most Americans’ asset 
portfolios.217 The proposed exemption could disqualify such real 
estate holdings as denominator assets for purposes of real-estate-
based private placements (such as limited partnerships for 
developing and operating real estate projects) to encourage 
diversification across asset classes. Ultimately, however, it seems 
                                                                                                     
 214. For example, Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff suggest that young 
investors borrow to enlarge their stock portfolios, partly on diversification 
grounds. See IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE, 
AND AUDACIOUS WAY TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR RETIREMENT 
PORTFOLIO 15–18 (2010) (proposing that young investors use leverage to 
diversify investment across time). 
 215. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012) (applying the crowdfunding 
investment cap on an aggregate annual basis); supra note 10 (discussing the 
aggregate investment cap). 
 216. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (describing the concept of 
covariance and its importance to diversification). 
 217. See ALFRED O. GOTTSCHALCK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NET WORTH AND THE 
ASSETS OF HOUSEHOLDS: 2002, at 1 (2008), http://www.census.gov/prod/2008 
pubs/p70-115.pdf (“[A]s home ownership rates climb, more and more households 
can claim their homes as a source of wealth and, in the majority of cases, as 
their predominant asset.”). According to 2002 census data, 67.7% of households 
include equity in their own home among their reported asset holdings. Id. at 5 
tbl.1. The median value of such equity is $73,697. Id. A much smaller 
percentage of households report owning rental property (4.5%) and other real 
estate (6.6%), though the median reported value of these asset types is relatively 
high ($100,000 and $45,000, respectively). Id. 
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likely the benefits of such refinements to the diversification test 
are outweighed by the associated administrative challenges. 
Issuers, investors, and regulators are not accustomed to 
classifying assets in this manner and in some cases there may not 
be adequate information for making reasonable assumptions 
about covariance. In contrast, participants in private placements 
are accustomed to determining asset value more generally as part 
of verifying accredited-investor status.218 In order to avoid self-
defeating administrative complexity, the proposal uses a simple 
diversification measure based on the purchaser’s total assets, 
regardless of the nature of those assets. 
2. A Liquidity Test 
An investor could demonstrate ability to bear illiquidity 
either through asset holdings or annual income. For the asset 
test, net (as opposed to gross) wealth is a sensible measure. To 
the extent that assets are encumbered by debt, those assets are 
less likely to be available for satisfying current obligations. In 
addition to net assets, high annual income suggests the capacity 
to hold illiquid private placements. Therefore, like the investment 
cap in the new crowdfunding exemption, the liquidity test would 
require that an investment not exceed the higher of: (1) a 
specified percentage of net assets, or (2) a specified percentage of 
annual income.219 In the absence of compelling reasons to pick a 
different number, the specified percentage could be 10%, similar 
to the current crowdfunding exemption.220 
As with the diversification measure, one could imagine more 
or less elaborate liquidity tests. It seems advisable to exclude 
other private placements as denominator assets for a net assets 
test, due to the inherent illiquidity of private placements. In 
theory, regulators could go further and classify all assets by 
relative liquidity and weigh them accordingly. For example, 
                                                                                                     
 218. See infra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing SEC guidance on 
verifying accredited-investor status). 
 219. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text (discussing the assets 
and income in the crowdfunding exemption). 
 220. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text (discussing the 
percentage thresholds in the crowdfunding exemption).  
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primary residences and retirement accounts with tax penalties 
for withdrawals could be disqualified or discounted as 
denominator assets based on their relative illiquidity.221 As with 
more elaborate diversification measures, the additional 
administrative complexities of these more elaborate liquidity 
measures likely outweigh the benefits. Accordingly, the proposal 
uses a liquidity test that could be satisfied based on income or net 
assets, with only private placements excluded as denominator 
assets. 
C. Competing Proposals 
Since the JOBS Act was enacted, others have suggested a 
modest additional role for investment caps. These competing 
proposals graft investment caps onto the existing regulatory 
framework by incorporating them into the current accredited-
investor definition.222 The result is that an issuer would gain 
significant regulatory freedom under Rule 506 if: (1) all 
purchasers meet threshold income and net worth standards 
similar to those currently employed in the accredited-investor 
definition and (2) purchasers also comply with an investment cap 
                                                                                                     
 221. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing relative liquidity 
of commonly held assets). 
 222. See Larissa Lee, Note, The Ban Has Lifted: Now Is the Time to Change 
the Accredited-Investor Standard, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 369, 386–88 (2014) 
(proposing modification of the accredited-investor definition to include adjusted 
wealth standards, an investment cap based on net assets or income, and 
subjective sophistication assessment); Oguss, supra note 158, at 310–18 
(proposing modification of the accredited-investor definition to adjust wealth 
standards for inflation and impose an investment cap of 25% of net assets, with 
a phase-out of the investment cap at some multiple of the wealth standards). 
Most recently, the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee recommended changes to 
the accredited-investor definition. The committee made a variety of 
recommendations, including financial literacy testing, facilitation of third-party 
investor-status verification, and investment caps. For illustrative purposes, the 
committee outlined an approach that would retain existing wealth standards as 
a minimum threshold for accredited-investor status, with an additional 
investment cap based on net assets or income that would phase out at some 
higher wealth standard. Recommendations of the Investor as Purchaser 
Subcommittee and the Investor Education Subcommittee: Accredited Investor 
Definition, INVESTOR ADVISORY COMM., http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-
advisory-committee-2012.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter 
Advisory Committee Recommendations]. 
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limiting their individual investments to a percentage of their net 
assets or income. By limiting reforms to the accredited-investor 
definition, current avenues for sales to non-accredited investors 
would remain intact.223 This Article departs from these competing 
proposals in several respects. 
First, because this Article’s proposal completely replaces 
Regulation D with investment caps, it eliminates current 
exemptions under Regulation D that allow sales to non-accredited 
investors in small offerings or after scaled disclosure. As 
discussed in Part IV.B.1 above, scaled disclosure is unlikely to 
provide investors with helpful information across a wide range of 
investment products, so this Article removes scaled disclosure 
from the core safe-harbor exemption and reserves that 
mechanism for context-specific exemptions where more 
meaningful disclosure standards might be possible.224 This Article 
also recommends eliminating the exemption in Rule 504 for small 
offerings ($1 million or less) on the logic that a small offering size 
can still cause significant losses if concentrated in a small 
number of investors.225 
Second, because this Article’s proposal completely replaces 
the concept of an accredited investor with the investment cap, it 
eliminates wealth thresholds of the type currently used in the 
accredited-investor definition. If wealth thresholds are a poor 
measure of financial sophistication or the ability to bear risk, as 
the bulk of commentary suggests,226 it is unclear what work they 
are doing in the regulatory scheme besides arbitrarily limiting 
the pool of eligible investors. If wealth thresholds are supposed to 
                                                                                                     
 223. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014) (setting forth Rule 504 of 
Regulation D, which allows sales to non-accredited investors if the total offering 
amount does not exceed $1 million); id. § 230.505 (setting forth Rule 505 of 
Regulation D, which allows offerings up to $5 million to non-accredited investors 
after provision of audited financials and specified information); id. § 230.506 
(setting forth Rule 506 of Regulation D, which allows sales to up to 35 
sophisticated, but non-accredited, investors after provision of audited financial 
statements and other specified disclosure).  
 224. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing failures of scaled disclosure); supra 
notes 211–12 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of context-
specific exemptions based on scaled disclosure and sorting). 
 225. See supra note 223 (describing Rule 504). 
 226. See supra note 158 (citing sources that are critical of the current 
accredited-investor definition). 
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be a proxy for access to professional advice, then they are not 
well-suited to the objective, as discussed further below.227 This 
Article takes the position that small investors should be 
permitted to risk a small amount of their small wealth, consistent 
with the goal of populist investor protection. 
Third, this Article’s proposal employs a two-part test 
specifically tailored to the dual goals of diversification and 
liquidity. As discussed above, gross rather than net assets are the 
logical denominator for achieving diversification.228 In addressing 
liquidity concerns, net assets or income are the appropriate 
measure, but private placements should not be counted as 
denominator assets.229 Without adding much administrative 
complexity, investment caps can be better suited to the relevant 
objectives than they have been in the past. 
To an extent, the modest approach of competing proposals 
might be chalked up to understandable pragmatic considerations. 
In the case of recent work by an SEC advisory committee, the 
scope of the recommendations was largely set by statutory 
mandate.230 Incremental and more easily won proposals also play 
an important role in legal scholarship.231 
But, it is also important to avoid past mistakes in simply 
piling on additional regulatory mechanisms without scrutinizing 
their fit for the job. There is a cost to regulatory clutter—poorly 
constructed exemptions can become counterproductive and 
obscure analytical clarity. A systematic analysis of the goals of 
private placement regulation and current mechanisms suggests a 
significant change in direction, with investment caps at the core 
of the regulatory scheme and current smart-money approaches at 
the periphery. More incremental reforms risk obscuring this 
broader insight. 
                                                                                                     
 227. See infra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing access to 
investment advice). 
 228. Supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. 
 229. Supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text. 
 230. See Advisory Committee Recommendations, supra note 222, at 2 
(referencing the SEC’s statutory mandate to review the accredited-investor 
definition). 
 231. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 55 (1992) (criticizing 
legal scholarship for making too many impractical reform proposals). 
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D. Potential Objections 
Any significant reforms will have drawbacks and detractors. 
This subpart anticipates and responds to potential objections. 
1. Diversification to Lower Quality 
An individual investor may have access to relatively few 
quality private placements, and the investment cap may push 
that investor to lower quality investments. For example, an 
investor with $2 million in total assets may plan to invest 
$200,000 in a startup launched by a trusted former colleague and 
friend, but the proposed investment cap might limit investment 
to $50,000. The investor might invest the remaining $150,000 in 
startups founded by strangers. Dividing the investment among 
four companies, rather than the one trusted entrepreneur, may 
expose the investor to higher transaction costs (because the 
investor may take additional steps to verify information) and 
increased chance of opportunistic behavior (because strangers are 
subject to weaker reputational constraints).   
Without empirical research testing the effects of caps, it is 
difficult to rule out this possibility altogether. But there are good 
reasons to suspect a different result. Investment in private 
placements is not as common as investment in real estate, public 
equities, investment funds held in retirement accounts, 
certificates of deposit, and life insurance products.232 One would 
expect the hypothetical investor to turn to these more accessible 
asset classes rather than stretching to find additional private 
placements.  
                                                                                                     
 232. See supra note 217 (discussing the number of households that report 
owning real estate); Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 205, at 24–31 tbl. 6 (reporting 
that the following percentages of households own the following investment 
products: retirement accounts, 50%; life insurance with cash-surrender value, 
20%; publicly traded stock, 15%; savings bonds, 12%; and certificates of deposit, 
12%). 
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2. Death by a Thousand Cuts 
One might object that this Article’s proposal, when compared 
to the current Rule 506, simply spreads losses around so that all 
investors suffer a little instead of a few investors suffering a lot. 
One might ask: what is achieved by shuffling around losses? 
First, modern portfolio theory suggests that where we situate 
risk matters greatly. Except in the rare case of perfectly 
correlated performance, the impact of an individual security’s 
risk is reduced when combined with other securities.233  
Second, this Article posits that investment caps may, over 
time, improve information by reducing incentives to defraud. In 
other words, individual outcomes may improve as high-quality 
issuers are better able to distinguish themselves.234 In contrast, 
the current accredited-investor concept may create the perfect 
storm for fraud and misinformation by lifting protections for 
wealthy but unsophisticated investors.235 
In sum, both a static view (assuming the reform simply 
redistributes failed investments) and a more dynamic view 
(asserting that investment caps will reduce fraud over time) 
suggest that reshuffling matters. 
3. Asset Verification Problems 
This Article eschews more complex diversification and 
liquidity standards for administrative ease, but the proposal still 
depends on relatively accurate estimates of asset values. One 
might object that the burdens of asset verification will make the 
exemption unattractive (if the verification process is too strict) or 
ineffective (if the process is too lax). 236 
                                                                                                     
 233. See supra notes 194–202 and accompanying text (discussing 
diversification and covariance). 
 234. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing incentives for 
fraud). 
 235. Supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 236. For a thoughtful discussion of verification issues relating to the 
crowdfunding exemption, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., Selling Equity Through 
Crowdfunding: A Comment, U. Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-11, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2386278 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ 
ssrn.2386278 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
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This same objection could be raised in regard to current 
sorting methods. The accredited-investor definition requires 
calculation of net assets and income,237 just like this Article’s 
proposal. Because the JOBS Act increased the importance of the 
accredited-investor standard, the SEC recently promulgated new 
guidance regarding acceptable asset and income verification 
methods. The SEC suggests, but does not require, review of tax 
documents, account statements, and certifications by securities 
professionals.238 The proposed investment cap could adopt this 
existing framework. 
4. Human Capital 
For many individuals, their greatest investment is human 
capital—the skills, experience, and education on which their 
livelihood is based.239 This Article’s proposal does not take human 
capital into account when calculating the cap. 
To an extent, this is just another tradeoff between more 
effective diversification and administrative ease. One could try to 
put a value on an investor’s human capital, attempt to establish 
the degree of correlation between that value and the type of 
private placement in question, and adjust the cap accordingly. 
But the administrative and theoretical difficulty of doing so 
would be considerable,240 so this Article’s proposal settles for less 
effective diversification.   
In limited circumstances, adding human capital to the 
equation could render an investment cap counterproductive. For 
example, an employee of a semiconductor company may be 
heavily invested in his or her employer’s stock, and investment in 
an oil and gas partnership, even in amounts above the 
                                                                                                     
 237. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215(e)–(f) (2014) (setting forth the definition of an 
accredited investor). 
 238. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2014). 
 239. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 228 (identifying human capital as an 
important asset); William K. S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market 
is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 371 (1986) (discussing human capital 
in the context of the capital-asset pricing model); John F. Wasik, The Biggest 
Financial Asset in Your Portfolio Is You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2013, at F7 
(asserting that human capital is often one’s most important asset).   
 240. See id. (discussing the difficulty of valuing human capital). 
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investment cap, might be helpful on diversification grounds 
because the investor started from such an undiversified position. 
But such an investor’s “diversification” strategy of sinking a large 
percentage of wealth into a single illiquid private placement 
leaves a lot to be desired. An investment cap may still have 
benefits if it prompts the investor to rethink the proposed 
investment and instead consider the more liquid and diversified 
investment products readily available in today’s marketplace.241 
5. Empirical Uncertainty 
This Article’s analysis is based on evidence where 
possible.242 But, some of its conclusions necessarily rest on 
empirically untested estimations of costs and benefits, such as 
whether sorting or investment caps improve overall information 
in the market by reducing incentives to defraud.  
Hopefully, this Article can serve as a starting point for future 
empirical research. But it is also important to recognize that 
empirical consensus takes time, and the dysfunction of current 
exemptions may justify regulatory experimentation sooner rather 
than later. In recent decisions, courts overturned rulemaking by 
second guessing how the SEC weighed competing empirical 
evidence.243 Regulatory policy may suffer if the SEC must wait for 
empirical researchers to complete relevant work, let alone reach a 
consensus. In some cases, adapting to the market may require 
playing a regulatory hunch and expanding apparently successful 
initiatives.244 
                                                                                                     
 241. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing typical 
investment assets). 
 242. See, e.g., supra notes 217, 232 (citing data on household wealth); supra 
notes 156, 210 (citing evidence regarding use of Regulation D). 
 243. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“In view of the admittedly (and at best) ‘mixed’ empirical evidence, we think the 
[Securities and Exchange] Commission has not sufficiently supported its 
conclusion . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 244. For example, in 1988 the SEC created a registration exemption 
specifically for stock option grants, apparently to accommodate emerging Silicon 
Valley compensation practices. See Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts, 
53 Fed. Reg. 12, 918-02 (Apr. 20, 1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 
239) (announcing the adoption of Rule 701 and referencing startup companies). 
The SEC then gradually expanded the exemption as it functioned without 
MAD MONEY 2315 
6. Why Protect the Rich? 
The proposed investment cap does not phase out at any 
income level. This is in part because it is assumed that issuers 
making sales to elite investors can rely on § 4(a)(2) of the ’33 Act 
and related case law, rather than the proposed safe harbor.245 
Still, one might ask whether private placement regulation should 
more definitively phase out at some level of wealth. 
First, there is a doctrinal answer to this question. The ’33 Act 
charges regulators with protecting investors without reference to 
wealth.246 And historically, case law interpreting the ’33 Act has 
based exemption on the investors’ ability to “fend for themselves,” 
not their ability to absorb loss.247  
Second, this Article suggests sound policy reasons for 
protecting the wealthy and unsophisticated. Their gullibility may 
have spillover effects by chumming the waters for fraud.248 
That said, regulatory resources are scarce, and it may be 
reasonable to leave the protection of the wealthiest to 
professional advisers. In that case, any wealth standard should 
be based on an informed judgment about the availability of 
quality investment advice. For example, many investment 
advisers require that a minimum value of assets be placed under 
the adviser’s management.249 If private placement regulation 
phases out, the threshold should be based on having assets in an 
amount and of a type consistent with these customary 
minimums.250  
                                                                                                     
notable abuse of stock option recipients. See MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 
115, at 244 (discussing the expansion of Rule 701 in 1999). 
 245. See supra Part V.A (describing the scope of the proposal). 
 246. Supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 247. Supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 145–46 (discussing potential 
negative spillover effects of unsophisticated investors). 
 249. See Marla Brill, How to Afford an Investment Adviser Without Breaking 
the Bank, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2011, 11:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/12/13/us-usa-investing-adviser-idUSTRE7BC1AN20111213 (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2014) (discussing traditional and emerging fee structures for 
investment advisers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 250. For example, one of the competing proposals discussed above includes a 
phase-out of the investment cap at a certain net asset value based on 
availability of professional advice. See Oguss, supra note 158, at 285. But a 
threshold based on the size of the individual’s investible assets (those capable of 
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VI. Conclusion 
We continue to view private placement regulation as an 
important lever for economic recovery and growth, but we are 
frustrated by policymakers’ inability to find the elusive balancing 
point between capital formation and investor protection. The 
existing discourse suggests that setting private placement policy 
should be like adjusting a carburetor. When private placements 
are too strict, we starve the economy of important fuel. When 
regulations are too lenient, we fail to protect investors by flooding 
them with aggressive and manipulative offerings. We expect that 
a skilled regulator or legislature, like a skilled mechanic, will 
eventually find the perfect balancing point. 
This Article suggests the concepts of capital formation and 
investor protection, their relationship to each other, and their 
relationship to specific regulatory policies are more complicated 
than the existing discourse suggests. A more nuanced analysis 
produces a surprising result. Investment caps—found in an 
obscure provision of a mostly ineffectual set of reforms—should 
be the foundation of private placement regulation. 
  
                                                                                                     
being put under management of an adviser, such as stocks, bonds, and cash) 
would be better tailored to this rationale. 
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Table 1 
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 251. A mechanism is strongly aligned or consistent with a goal when it 
apparently advances the goal with no material and counter-productive side 
effects. A mechanism is moderately aligned with a goal when it arguably both 
advances and frustrates the goal and it is unclear which effect dominates. A 
mechanism is weakly aligned with a goal when it does not advance the goal in 
any appreciable way, or it frustrates the goal without materially advancing it at 
the same time. 
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